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Revenue Sharing in European Football: An Assessment of the Bundesliga’s New
Four-Pillar Model
Niklas T. Bretschneider
Otto Beisheim School of Management
Abstract
This thesis assesses the Bundesliga’s recently introduced TV revenue sharing system. Despite the prominent literature dis-
cussing the relationship between revenue sharing in team sports and competitive balance, evaluations of specific distribution
systems are limited. Hence, very little is known about the repercussions of different allocation keys on leagues and clubs.
Contributing to the sports economics literature, this thesis examines the key decision factors that influence the effectiveness
of revenue sharing systems, and analyses the feasibility of the Bundesliga’s reformed system.
It starts with defining the new system, before introducing its background and a brief history of revenue sharing in the
Bundesliga. Then this thesis sketches the most important concepts in sports economics, i.e. competitive balance and demand,
before pointing out interdependencies between them. Afterwards, revenue sharing is introduced as a means to enhance
competitive balance, including a brief description of alternative mechanisms. To compare the new model externally, revenue
sharing models of other major sports leagues are presented. Finally, it evaluates the Bundesliga’s current situation in order to
comprehend the league’s potential objectives. The thesis discusses possibilities on how revenue sharing can help the Bundesliga
achieve those objectives, and ultimately assesses the new system’s feasibility in doing so. After modelling the league’s potential
reaction to different revenue sharing models, its result is that the four-pillar model features several useful mechanisms, but
does not give sufficient weight to them. The thesis’ assessment consequently is that the reformed system can be generally seen
as positive, with room for further enhancements. It concludes with some starting points for potential future improvements,
namely (1) increasing the equally-distributed share, (2) scaling up the new pillars’ relative importance and mitigating the
danger of an overdominant team, and (3) implementing a top-to-bottom maximum payout cap.
Keywords: TV Revenue Sharing, Four-Pillar Model, Bundesliga, Football, Soccer, DFL
1. Introduction
1.1. Relevance of Topic
In 2016, the Bundesliga, Germany’s prime football
league, announced a reform of its existing revenue sharing
system. Contrary to basing revenue allocation mainly on past
performances, the new system also considers “softer” factors
such as sustainability and work with young talents. The new
system was introduced as a result of persistent discussions
between the various stakeholders, and its introduction led
to controversial opinions and emotions. This paper aims at
assessing the quality of the new revenue sharing system, in
order to be able to make a final judgement on whether it is an
improvement to the incumbent mechanism. As TV revenue
is one of football clubs’ primary sources of income, a fair
and rational sharing system is essential for positive develop-
ment of the teams and the Bundesliga. Future international
competitiveness of both clubs and the league is highly depen-
dent on the economic development of the Bundesliga itself.
Therefore, it is crucial for all stakeholders to assess whether
the recently introduced model is a step in the right direction,
or a threat for future growth.
1.2. Objective of the Thesis
The 0verall objective of this thesis is to answer whether
the Bundesliga’s new TV revenue sharing model is an im-
provement to the old system, and feasible for reaching the
league’s objectives. Furthermore, the thesis aims at dis-
cussing potential room for improvement of the mechanism,
while suggesting clear starting points for enhancements. Fi-
nally, the assessment will determine the effect of the reform
on the league’s clubs, depending on their current competi-
tive situation. In addition, this thesis gives overviews of the
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most relevant concepts and topics in sports economics and
revenue sharing in professional team sports.
This thesis is the first academic work that specifically
deals with the implications and feasibility of the Bundesliga’s
new revenue sharing mechanism. Additionally, it refers to
the Bundesliga’s current situation and strategic aims, making
it highly up to date and relevant for the Bundesliga’s decision
makers. Hence, it represents an innovative contribution to
the sports economics literature, and supplements the leading
theoretical works in this area by a practical application.
1.3. Outline and Method of the Thesis
After introducing the new revenue sharing model and its
background, this thesis will discuss the key concepts used
in sports economics, including relevant literature on these
topics. Subsequently, the different forms of revenue shar-
ing common in professional team sports are presented to re-
veal their workings and implications. Additionally, the preva-
lent revenue sharing systems in several international football
and sports leagues are introduced to create opportunities for
external benchmarking. This thesis then assesses the Bun-
desliga’s new revenue sharing model by analysing the sys-
tem’s capabilities to contribute to the league’s strategic devel-
opment. For this, three strategic aims for the league are de-
veloped based on the Bundesliga’s current situation. Further-
more, the thesis introduces a theoretical model which is used
to describe movements in competitive balance based on dif-
ferent revenue sharing models. Finally, some starting points
for possible future improvements of the system are discussed.
1.4. Limitations of the Thesis
One of the main limitations of this thesis is the lack of
time between its creation and the introduction of the new
revenue sharing system. This makes it difficult to find empir-
ical evidence regarding the actual effectiveness of the reform.
Therefore, the thesis focuses on potential qualitative implica-
tions of the new model rather than data-based findings of the
reform.
Additionally, the literature on the specific topic of revenue
sharing in the Bundesliga is limited. This could prove prob-
lematic as the studies and papers this thesis is based on are
mostly not specifically related to the Bundesliga. As sports
leagues usually differ in several aspects such as consumer
preferences and league structures, uncertainty regarding the
full transferability of findings from other leagues exists.
2. The Bundesliga’s New Revenue Sharing Model
2.1. Chapter Overview
Following an introduction of the Bundesliga’s new rev-
enue sharing model, including the specific manner of func-
tioning and information on the formation process, this Chap-
ter highlights the historic development of revenue sharing in
the Bundesliga. Furthermore, the interests of different key
stakeholders of the new system are exposed, which will fi-
nally be used to assess the feasibility of potential reforms.
2.2. Definition
In November 2016, the Deutsche Fußball-Liga (DFL, Ger-
man Football League) announced the redesign of the national
revenue sharing model in the Bundesliga (DFL (2016)). Con-
trary to the previous model that only included two criteria,
the new model covers four pillars (cf. Figure 1). The new
model will become active with the start of the 2017/18 Bun-
desliga season, while the recently signed TV deal starts in
that season as well. An overview of the TV revenue distribu-
tion (according to the existing model) for the 2016/17 season
can be found in the Appendix (cf. Figure 2) for illustrating
purposes. The redesigned system will be introduced in the
following.
The major pillar with 70% of national revenues is Perfor-
mance (pillar 1) (DFL (2016)). All 36 clubs in the 1. and
2. Bundesliga are evaluated based on their domestic com-
petitive performance in the last 5 years. More recent years
are weighted more heavily (ratio 5:4:3:2:1) and table place-
ments are added up to a five-year ranking, separately for the
1. and the 2. Bundesliga. The leading team of the 1. Bun-
desliga ranking receives 5.8% of national revenues, while the
last team receives 2.9%. Similarly for the 2. Bundesliga rank-
ing, the first team receives 1.69%, while the last team gets
0.75%. This pillar aims at rewarding competitive success of
the league’s clubs.
Pillar 2, Competitive Sustainability, is one of the new cri-
teria that is introduced with the start of the 2017/18 season.
The performance of all 36 1. and 2. Bundesliga clubs over the
last 20 years is consolidated with an equal weighting. 5% of
national revenues are distributed based on this single ranking
for both leagues. This criterion aims to value the long-term
contribution of a club to the development of the Bundesliga.
The third criterion, distributing 2% of national revenues,
is Young Talent (pillar 3). It will be introduced with the
2017/18 season as well. Revenues are allocated proportion-
ally to the minutes that a club used players aged 23 and under
in any Bundesliga game1. Only players, who were trained in
Germany or joined a club in Germany before the age of 18,
are considered for this pillar. Hence, this pillar aims to moti-
vate clubs to focus on the development of youth players.
Another major pillar is the final criterion, Competition
(pillar 4), with a share of 23% of national revenues. Simi-
larly to pillar 1, the competitive performance of the clubs is
evaluated based on the last 5 seasons. In comparison to pillar
1, all 36 clubs are consolidated to a single ranking. Further-
more, the exact revenue percentages of table positions differ,
in order to boost attractiveness in different table regions. As
an example, the first six clubs in this ranking receive the same
share of national revenues. Pillar 4 rewards clubs who per-
form well, making its intention similar to the first pillar.
The model for the distribution of international revenues,
meaning revenue based on demand from abroad for the Bun-
desliga and not revenues from participations in international
competitions, is based on three pillars (DFL (2016)). Firstly,
1Excluding extra time and relegation games
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one quarter of revenues is distributed equally to all 1. Bun-
desliga clubs, regardless of their participation in an interna-
tional competition. Secondly, 50% are distributed according
to a five-year ranking in which the achieved points propor-
tionally determine the share of revenues. Contrary to the
established UEFA five-year ranking2, there are several modi-
fications to the ranking such as the omission of bonus points
for achievement of group phases. Finally, the remaining 25%
of international revenues are distributed proportionally ac-
cording to the participation of clubs in the Champions League
and Europa League, with one participation being worth one
point. Although 2. Bundesliga clubs normally do not partici-
pate in international competitions, an amount of € 5 million
is allocated to this league starting with the 2017/18 season3.
This displays a strong surge in the stake of the 2. Bundesliga,
as the previous model only provided € 1.8 million per year
to this league.
2.3. Background
The new revenue sharing model was introduced few
months after the DFL signed the most valuable TV contract
in the history of the Bundesliga. Consequently, the Ger-
man professional clubs will receive € 4.6 billion over the
next four seasons, starting with the 2017/18 season. Mr.
Rauball, president of the DFL, stated that the new contract
would generate significant additional revenues for all clubs
(Sportschau (2016)). Additionally, he predicted that the
new revenue sharing model would be in the interest of me-
dia partners and spectators in the stadiums and at home, as
it promotes an attractive competition. Finally, Rauball said
that, despite different interests of the clubs, the new model
connects a merit principle with solidarity, including a long-
term orientation through a focus on work with young talent
and sustainability.
There were some controversial discussions in the creation
process of the new model. While several clubs endorsed the
existing performance-based revenue sharing model, a unity
of 1. Bundesliga clubs called Team Marktwert (“Team Mar-
ket Value”) emerged before the DFL’s decision regarding its
new allocation system (Ashelm (2016)). This coalition of
six clubs (Eintracht Frankfurt, Werder Bremen, Hertha BSC,
Hamburger SV, 1. FC Köln, VfB Stuttgart) aimed to promote
a sharing model that covers market value-based criteria4, in-
cluding “soft factors” such as TV viewing figures, fan bases
and social media interaction rates. Team Marktwert argued
that clubs with huge fan bases and long traditions drive the
global popularity of the Bundesliga brand and interest in the
league. They concluded that a redesign of the model to-
wards a more market value-based one would make the distri-
bution “more fair and modern” (Sportschau (2016)). As all
2The UEFA five-year ranking measures the success of a league’s clubs
in its competitions Europa League and Champions League, and allocates a
league’s starting places for both competitions accordingly
3Increasing by € 1 million every year thereafter
4It is important to note that market value in this context relates to demand
for a team from spectators, and not to the market value of a club’s players
members of the initiative are Traditionsvereine (“traditional
clubs”), they would profit from such a redesign, while clubs
with less tradition and smaller fan bases such as 1899 Hof-
fenheim or RB Leipzig would suffer financially.
While Team Marktwert was one of the main drivers for a
more market value-based model, there were also several crit-
ical voices regarding their idea. Christian Heidel, back then
manager of Mainz 05, argued that such a redesign could pre-
vent smaller clubs from the 2. Bundesliga to establish itself
in the 1. Bundesliga (Evelt (2016)). Other critics claimed
that Team Marktwert only raised those demands as they mis-
managed their clubs for several years and, as a result, needed
more income to become top clubs again. Clubs like Borussia
Dortmund and Borussia Mönchengladbach, that have large
fan bases and long league belongings as well, manage to be
successful without special financial aids. Therefore, critics
say that the claims of Team Marktwert are mainly based on
self-interest, and not on objective considerations.
Top clubs like Bayern Munich hold the opinion that rev-
enues should be distributed with an even higher focus on
competitive success. These clubs have the concern to lose
their international competitiveness, as clubs from leagues
like the English Premier League continue to have surging
TV revenues (cf. Figure 3). Although the Bundesliga’s new
record TV contract yields about€ 1.15 billion per season, the
Premier League outshines this figure with a revenue of about
£2.9 billion per season (Harris (2016)). As a consequence,
Mr. Rummenigge, chairman of Bayern Munich, stated “we
are happy to participate in any discussion regarding solidar-
ity, as long as it does not endanger our international compet-
itiveness” (DKB (2017)).
After continuous discussions regarding this matter, the
DFL finally decided to not include any market value-based
criteria in their new sharing model (DFL (2016)). The of-
ficial reasoning was that the establishment of “criteria such
as number of fans and TV viewing figures [. . . ] would have
caused difficulties regarding measurability and comparabil-
ity”. The decision can be seen as positive for top clubs and
clubs with short league belongings, while traditional clubs,
especially Team Marktwert, could not enforce their claims.
Overall, the majority of clubs, including members of Team
Marktwert, reacted positively to the announcement of the
new model (Mitteldeutsche Zeitung (2016)). Mr. Watzke,
CEO of Borussia Dortmund, stated: “I think it is a good com-
promise. Sustainable performance is rewarded, as it should
be. It is a good signal”. Mr. Filbry, Chairman of the Board
at Werder Bremen, said “The DFL’s decision leads to a mod-
ern and fair allocation. [. . . ] We can be satisfied”. Hertha
BSC Berlin’s manager Mr. Preetz argued “It is a huge chal-
lenge to ensure a balanced distribution. [. . . ] Overall, we are
happy”. Although most opinions on the reform were gener-
ally affirmative, some voices raised criticism regarding the
exact workings of some of the model’s pillars. As an exam-
ple, Mr. Hellmann, board member of Eintracht Frankfurt,
explained that “The criterion of Bundesliga belonging [pillar
2] is only backward-looking. Therefore, we are not optimally
satisfied with the choice of criteria”.
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2.4. Historic Development of TV Revenue Sharing in the
Bundesliga
Before the DFL introduced the new four-pillar revenue
sharing model, TV revenues of Bundesliga clubs were dis-
tributed according to a simple formula: 80% of revenues
were allocated to the 18 clubs in the 1. Bundesliga, while
the remaining 20% were allocated to the 2. Bundesliga clubs
(DPA (2016)). Within the leagues, clubs received a fixed ba-
sic amount and a variable share that is based on competitive
performance in the last five years, with the most recent year
being the most important factor5. Through this system, clubs
could only maximize their revenue share by increasing their
table standings.
Prior to the 2001/2002 Bundesliga season, the TV rev-
enue allocation was rather unsophisticated and all clubs,
no matter how well they performed, received an approx-
imately equal share of the sale of the TV rights (Quitzau
(2015)). With the start of that season, the allocation was
firstly based on performance, introducing a system in which
well-performing clubs receive a larger revenue share and
vice versa. This development was the result of increasing
earnings through TV commercialisation (cf. Figure 4), as the
larger clubs, that suffered from a growing implicit loss of
revenue due to the collective sale of TV broadcasting rights
(TV revenue sharing), became increasingly unsatisfied.
The Bundesliga was first broadcasted on TV, when the
Sportschau started to show summaries of Bundesliga games,
after paying a fee of DM 0.65 million in 1965 (Landwehr
(2015)). After an increasing popularity of Sportschau Bun-
desliga broadcasts, leading to a TV deal of DM 10 million
in 1988, the private TV Channel RTL acquired the rights for
three years of Bundesliga broadcasting for DM 135 million.
While this deal already meant a great financial enhancement
for the Bundesliga, another private TV channel, SAT.1, im-
proved the situation even further through paying a sum of
DM 700 million for a five-year deal starting in 1992. The
pay TV channel Premiere broadcasted the first conference
broadcast in the 2000/2001 season, investing DM 355 mil-
lion solely for that season. After economic difficulties of sev-
eral broadcasters in the following years, the Sportschau rose
again as a relevant Bundesliga show and Sky, formerly Pre-
miere, continued to grow. This development ended with the
record TV deals of the last years, primarily driven by ARD
(Sportschau) and Sky.
3. Key Concepts in Sports Economics
3.1. Chapter Overview
In order to be able to assess whether the new TV revenue
sharing model in the Bundesliga is feasible, it is necessary
to understand the concepts through which the system can be
evaluated. In the following, several relevant academic works
regarding these ideas are introduced, to highlight peculiar-
ities of the sports business and interdependencies between
5Weighting 5:4:3:2:1, with 5 being the most recent season
our key concepts. This Chapter will finally be used to deter-
mine potential effects of the new revenue sharing system on
competitive balance and demand within the Bundesliga.
3.2. Competitive Balance
3.2.1. Introduction
Competitive balance is one of the main concepts in sports
economics. It describes the balance of playing strengths as
well as game outcomes in professional sports competitions.
The higher the uncertainty of outcome of a match or sea-
son, the higher the competitive balance. It is often argued
that competitive balance is one of the main drivers of de-
mand for a match, as spectators generally perceive tense
matches with high outcome uncertainty as more attractive
than clear “David vs. Goliath” matchups. Zimbalist (2002)
described the issue with competitive balance in the following
way: “Competitive balance is like wealth. Everyone agrees
it is a good thing to have, but no one knows how much one
needs”. Sports leagues are businesses who sell competition
on the playing field (Fort and Quirk (1995)), so it makes
sense that competitive balance is one of the main drivers of
fan interest and financial success. Sanderson and Siegfried
(2003) stated that, at the time of their paper’s release, com-
petitive balance was the issue that received most attention,
out of all controversies in baseball. This confirms the large
importance of the topic in sports economics.
Research in the area of competitive balance is mainly
focussed along two areas: Analysis of Competitive Balance
(ACB) and Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis (UOH) (Fort
and Maxcy (2003)). ACB aims at explaining “what has hap-
pened to competitive balance over time or as a result of
changes” in the organization of professional sports leagues.
On the contrary, UOH research tries to explain the effect
of (changes in) competitive balance on fans and demand.
Simply put, UOH measures fan welfare, while ACB tracks
competitive balance itself. These two areas of research are
“(weak) complements”: A change in competitive balance
found by ACB studies might imply an important movement
for UOH research. At the same time, a change in spectator
behaviour measured by UOH studies does not necessarily re-
quire a change in the actual competitive balance, measured
by ACB research. According to Fort and Macxy, it is essential
to pursue both ACB and UOH research, as this is the only way
to understand the relationship between competitive balance
and the business approach of sports leagues, as well as the
effect of competitive balance on fans and spectators.
The theoretical developments regarding competitive bal-
ance are mainly based on few key sources. After Rottenberg
(1956) and El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) built a basis for fur-
ther research, Fort and Quirk (1995) reviewed these early
works, and Fort and Maxcy (2003) gave an introduction to
existing works in the field of competitive balance.
Rottenberg’s 1956 article in the Journal of Political Eco-
momy (Rottenberg (1956)), the starting point for most of
sports economics literature, found that, while a sports league
is definitely an industry with uncommon features, it gener-
ally can be treated as a normal economic industry. He found
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that the competitors, in essence sport clubs, have to be of
approximately equal size and strength in order to be suc-
cessful, which is “a unique attribute of professional compet-
itive sports”. Rottenberg discusses competitive balance as
he states that “Teams [. . . ] usually prefer winning to los-
ing. [. . . ] They [. . . ] prefer winning by close margins.
If their market behaviour is consistent with this objective
[. . . ] playing talent will be [. . . ] equally distributed among
teams”. This observation shows that a team does not neces-
sarily wants to maximize its own strength in order to max-
imize its own utility, as an overdominant team would be
rather unappealing to a spectator who cares about tense com-
petition (Louis-Schmelling Paradox, Neale (1964), see Chap-
ter 3.5). In other words, competitive balance matters in
the design of sports contests. Although free markets are
extremely unlikely to produce a league with equal playing
strengths, Rottenberg argues that free markets are likely to
produce the same results as other market forms, while max-
imizing total welfare. Therefore, Rottenberg recommends
a free market as optimal design for a professional sports
league. He implies that, regardless of whether the league’s
owner decides to intervene using competitive balance mea-
sures, the same talent allocation results. This finding is one of
the major discussion points in sports economics and referred
to as Rottenberg’s Invariance Principle (IP).
Several works discuss the practical validity of the IP, such
as Fort et al. (2016). Fort et al. found ambiguous results
after analysing empirical datasets of different leagues and
regions: In some cases, the IP holds, while in other cases,
the IP can be rejected. These results depend on the observed
league and the respective measures used to enhance compet-
itive balance. As no clear answer to this issue was found yet,
there is room for more research in the field of Rottenberg’s
Invariance Principle. Rottenberg’s considerations were chal-
lenged by several works in the past, such as Sloane’s 2006 pa-
per “Rottenberg and the Economics of Sport after 50 years”
(Sloane (2006)). Sloane points out that, although Rotten-
berg’s thoughts contributed significantly to the development
of sports economics, some assumptions do not hold (any-
more) in today’s sports world, meaning that a reassessment is
required. Examples are an overestimation of the importance
of gate revenue, the questionable assumption that competi-
tors are of equal size, and the practicability of two league
models. Therefore, Rottenberg’s initial article should be crit-
ically challenged when using it to model today’s world.
El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) found that, based on their ap-
proach to an economic model of a professional sports league,
sports leagues do not seem to converge towards an equaliza-
tion of playing strengths. In their opinion, such an equaliza-
tion would be possible in the case of generally equal revenue
potential of all clubs – a condition that is not fulfilled in the
majority of sports leagues, as clubs are based in territories
with different populations. They suggest implementing rules
that let a league converge to equal playing strengths, e.g.
a prohibition of player sales. However, El-Hodiri & Quirk
also acknowledge that previous attempts in this area did not
show significant signs of success in the equalization of play-
ing strengths and, therefore, the enhancement of compet-
itive balance. Another important finding of their paper is
that “equalization of playing strengths is generally not consis-
tent with profit maximization by teams”. Consequently, clubs
and leagues must find the right trade-off between optimizing
profit and optimizing competitive balance, as those measures
are mutually exclusive.
In their article “Cross-subsidization, Incentives and Out-
comes in Professional Sports Leagues”, Fort and Quirk (1995)
discuss issues when thinking about competitive balance.
Their findings are based on the fact that different clubs in
the same league normally have strongly varying revenue
potentials, leading to a convergence to unequal playing
strengths and a decreasing competitive balance. Fort and
Quirk discuss different opportunities of cross-subsidization,
e.g. salary caps, the rookie draft, gate and TV revenue shar-
ing, and their feasibility in increasing competitive balance
while not harming the profit of any club. Their findings
show that the majority of measures to improve competitive
balance, such as substituting the reserve-option clause with
free agency in Baseball, do not affect competitive balance.
These measures usually also affect the distribution of profits
within the involved league, which is problematic, as it is
difficult to find a consensus in such a situation with profit-
maximizing clubs. Although they highlight salary caps as
mean to increase competitive balance while offering benefits
to all involved teams, Fort & Quirk state that this measure
is “inconsistent with league wide revenue maximisation”,
leading to an enforcement problem of the respective league.
They conclude that an enforceable salary cap is the only
feasible cross-subsidization mean that is currently in use.
3.2.2. Differences between American and European Sports
Leagues
As discussed in Fort & Quirk’s article, finding the right
measures to increase competitive balance, while not finan-
cially disadvantaging teams and staying consistent with
league wide profit optimization, is difficult. Which mea-
sures are feasible in the respective situation is highly de-
pendent on the general league structure. Leagues can be
generally clustered in two main types: American (closed)
and European (open) professional team sports leagues (An-
dreff (2011)). They differ in the fact that closed leagues
do not allow promotion and relegation and therefore have
a market entry barrier, while open leagues are theoretically
accessible by every team in inferior leagues through pro-
motion. American leagues have several “institutional and
legal peculiarities” (Dietl et al. (2012)), such as collective
bargaining, cooperative-like league forms and a high degree
of league autonomy. Additionally, if we compare the exam-
ple of US-American and European sports leagues, another
important difference between them are competing leagues.
US-American leagues normally have a monopoly: There is
one relevant league (e.g. NFL, NBA) that covers a large ge-
ographic area (USA, 325 million inhabitants (US Census Bu-
reau (2017))), while there is no other league globally with a
similar scope. In comparison, European sports leagues (e.g.
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Bundesliga, Premier League) usually cover a single Euro-
pean country (e.g. Germany, 83 million inhabitants (Destatis
(2017))) and have competing leagues in their direct geo-
graphic neighbourhood. Leagues in the European systems
often are in direct competition as they try to sign players
from each other, compete in continent-wide competitions
(e.g. UEFA Champions League) and generate (broadcasting)
demand from each other’s countries. More detailed informa-
tion on the differences between the two league types can be
found in Andreff (2011) “Some comparative economics of
the organization of sports“. Overall, academics see the differ-
ences between these league systems as “interesting economic
question as to which system achieves better results” (Rosen
and Sanderson (2001)) – a question, that has not been fully
answered yet.
The difference between those systems has a direct and
significant impact on the feasibility of measures aiming to
enhance competitive balance. While American leagues can
implement measures such as salary caps, competitive balance
tax and player drafts relatively easily, European leagues “suf-
fer” from the fact that they are governed by a national soccer
federation (e.g. DFL), but compete internationally. If the
Bundesliga would decide to implement salary caps as mean
to equalise team strengths nationally, it would voluntarily im-
pose a new constraint, in this case a maximum salary, on
clubs. If a German club now negotiates with an international
top player, as it is likely that a profit-maximizing player will
move to a club in a league without the constraint, as this
club would still be in the position to pay a salary above the
German cap. It is therefore hard for European leagues to im-
plement most of the conventional competitive balance mea-
sures, as these measures automatically reduce international
competitiveness of the league. Meanwhile, league author-
ities of American leagues can implement mechanisms like
salary caps more easily through their monopolistic standing.
Clubs do not suffer from the problem that a top player would
move to a different league to earn more money, as there
are normally no other economically relevant leagues in their
sport. Consequently, the already hard task of finding means
to increase competitive balance in a league is even harder
for leagues that follow a European, open league structure.
An overview of the most common measures to enhance com-
petitive balance can be found in Chapter 4.
3.2.3. Measuring Competitive Balance
There are several approaches to measure the actual de-
gree of competitive balance in a professional sports league.
The most prominent and widely regarded as the most useful
measure is the standard deviation of team winning percent-
ages within a season, used in works such as Fishman (2003)
and Besanko and Simon (1985). However, this measure
is constrained by some downsides, as elaborated in Owen
(2010) paper “Limitations of the relative standard deviation
of win percentages for measuring competitive balance [. . . ]”,
such as a variable upper bound that makes cross-league com-
parisons hard.
The degree of competitive balance may also be measured
by the deviation of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (dHHI)
from the “most equal distribution of wins” (Larsen et al.
(2006)). This index is mathematically related to the stan-
dard deviation of wins, and is a common measure in several
industries to examine market structure. The Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) itself is defined as quadratic summa-
tion of all firm market shares in an industry. The case that a
team wins exactly half of its games, meaning perfect compet-
itive balance, results in an dHHI of zero. However, the dHHI
suffers from the same bias as the adjusted Gini coefficient,
as the upper bound of the dHHI is usually not attainable in a
sports league. Nevertheless, the dHHI is a popular indicator
used to track competitive balance.
Besides the indicators just discussed, there is a large vari-
ety of other indicators, measuring competitive balance in dif-
ference ways (Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, & Univer-
sity of Tübingen (2013)). They can be generally structured
in long-term or inter-seasonal ones (e.g. H index), medium-
term or intra-seasonal ones (e.g. UCS measure) and short-
term or individual ones (e.g. Theil index). A combination of
all types results can be used to compare competitive balance
in different leagues objectively.
3.3. Demand
3.3.1. Introduction
The core product of a professional sports league is the
game itself, including what happens on and off the field and
the manner the contest is conducted (Borland and MacDon-
ald (2003)). As most teams engage in a yearly tournament
where every team plays against each other, another product
of the game is created: a sports league. The league does not
only represent the sum of all games, but also other elements,
e.g. non-saleable externalities such as the league standing ef-
fect6. The essence of demand for a game or a sports league is
fan interest, a force that is expressed by watching or listening
to games in the stadium or away, live or delayed, regularly
or erratic. Fan interest is also reflected by the purchase of
products related to the game: merchandising products, gam-
bling or products of sponsors. The utility that fans obtain
from these actions can be generally divided in two categories.
Firstly, identification with a team, founded on a geographic
or emotional connection, which undisputedly enhances fan
interest. Secondly, the quality of the contest, driven by ex-
traordinary physical or mental ability of the players and un-
certainty of outcome.
One has to differentiate between direct and derived
demands for sporting contests (Borland and MacDonald
(2003)). Direct demand describes the case where a con-
sumer derives value from the sporting contest, in form of
live attendance at a match or demand for watching matches
on a pay-per-view (PPV) basis. Derived demand is a more
complex topic, as it includes the demand of broadcasters
seeking input of a game to produce shows, organizations
6Describing the effect that the demand for a match is higher, when table
standings are closer
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seeking opportunities to market their products or enhance
their brand name or governments seeking economic activity
to attract tourists to the country.
According to Borland and MacDonald (2003), “under-
standing about the nature and determinants of demand is
arguably the most important empirical issue in analysis of
professional sporting markets”. The objective of most teams
is to maximize profits or competitive success. To achieve this,
it is a crucial factor to maximize team revenue, which is of-
ten driven by demand and fan interest. Therefore, most ob-
jectives of sports leagues can be reduced to the objective of
maximizing fan interest, showing that demand is an essential
factor for most decisions being made by sports teams.
3.3.2. Determinants of Demand for Attendance
The economic theory of demand for attendance at profes-
sional sports matches is based on a consumer-theory model,
where the consumer chooses a consumption bundle that
maximizes utility, while under a budget constraint. Apply-
ing this theory suggests five main categories of determinants
for demand for attendance, which will be introduced in the
following (Borland and MacDonald (2003)).
Consumer Preferences fundamentally determine the de-
mand for attendance at sporting competitions. Demand in-
creases with the quality-adjusted quantity consumed, mean-
ing that the spectator will gain more utility when visiting
more games, when his favoured team wins, the stadium is
sold out (bandwagon effects) or he has a habit of visiting
matches (team loyalty).
Economic factors can be generally split in personal and
macroeconomic factors. Factors such as the price of admis-
sion, opportunity costs and the spectator’s income play an
important role in the decision-making progress of whether to
attend a match or not. Another important aspect are substi-
tutes – a person can substitute attending the game directly
by watching the game on TV, or indirectly by other forms
of entertainment, such as visiting a cinema. Macroeconomic
factors rather determine the overall pool of attendance at a
game: factors like the rate of unemployment and size of pop-
ulation drive the overall attendance at a match.
Quality of viewing describes the venue where the match
takes place, taking into account factors such as quality of
seating, weather conditions, placement of seating, as well as
the timing of the match.
The characteristics of the sporting contest are some of the
most important demand determinants. This factor includes
the success of the teams playing in a match, the quality of the
match, uncertainty of the game outcome and significance of
the contest. Consequently, fan interest increases when e.g.
successful teams are playing, the players’ skill is high, the
matchup is even and the game is decisive, as in a tournament
final or derby7. Uncertainty of outcome can be divided into
two drivers of fan interest: Firstly, intra-seasonal uncertainty
is expressed for instance through an even degree of team win-
ning percentages at a point in a season, meaning that more
7Synonym for a match of two local rivals
teams are likely to still reach the playoffs or international
qualifying positions. Secondly, inter-seasonal uncertainty of
outcome describes the “extent of turnover in the identity of
teams” (Borland and MacDonald (2003)) which win titles or
participate in tournaments. Schreyer et al. (2016) showed
that season ticket holders indeed react favourably to a high
uncertainty of outcome. However, Buraimo and Simmons
(2015) found that there is no significant long-term impact
of outcome uncertainty on demand, but a preference for in-
creased talent, a “preference for [. . . ] entertainment deliv-
ered by superstars”. We can observe that the findings regard-
ing the significance of several parts of this demand determi-
nant are partly contrary, and leave room for further research
(see Chapter 3.5).
The last determinant of attendance is supply capacity,
which relates to the actual capacity of the stadium or venue.
While desired attendance is lower than stadium capacity, it is
equal to actual attendance, but as soon as it is larger, there is
a capacity constraint on attendance, leading to a lower actual
than potential attendance.
Scelles et al. (2013) tried to determine drivers of de-
mand through a differentiation of competitive balance and
competitive intensity. While they defined competitive bal-
ances as equilibrium between teams in a league, leading to
uncertainty of outcome, they introduced competitive inten-
sity as additional criterion. According to them, the latter re-
lates to the prizes distributed to the contest and the stakes of
the match. As an example, a game of a top team against a
bottom-of-the-table team, that decides whether the top team
will win the championship, would have a high competitive in-
tensity while having a low uncertainty of outcome. Cup com-
petitions, playoffs and relegation matches are other examples
for games with high competitive intensity. Based on data of
attendance at Ligue 18 games, they found that competitive
balance does not significantly impacts demand, while the ef-
fect of competitive intensity is significantly positive. Their
findings show that the severity of the game outcome should
always be considered in addition to “traditional” competitive
balance, when analysing demand for attendance at football
games. Although it is likely that this relationship is a general
one, it is not entirely clear whether these findings also fully
hold in other leagues and, more importantly, for TV broad-
casts.
3.3.3. Effects of TV Broadcasts
While these determinants are important drivers of de-
mand for attendance, one must consider that demand for
a sports league is not only driven by physical attendance,
but even more by demand for broadcasting. For broadcast-
ing, such as live TV conferences, factors like quality of view-
ing and supply capacity only play a tangential role. At the
same time, there is evidence that some factors play a more
important role in the context of TV broadcasts, such as un-
certainty of outcome, which significantly attracts (Schreyer
8Prime French Football League
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et al. (2016)) the “couch potato audience” (Forrest et al.
(2005)). In the last years, the television audience for many
sports leagues became so big that it “dwarfs that in the sta-
dium” (Forrest et al. (2005)), which is reflected in constantly
rising player salaries and the fact that teams gain more rev-
enue from TV than from physical attendance.
The exact effect of TV broadcasts on physical attendance
has been discussed in several academic works. There seems
to be an asymmetric effect between both forms of demand:
physical attendance positively influences TV demand, while
broadcasting negatively influences physical demand (Bu-
raimo (2008)). It is important to distinguish between season
ticket holders (STHs) and pay-at-the-gate spectators (Allan
(2008)), as the latter are less likely to attend a large num-
ber of games in a season, and is likely to be more sensitive
to match factors than STHs. Furthermore, it is useful for
further analysis to split the pay-at-the-gate group into home
and away spectators. According to Allan, STHs tend to be
loyal supporters that attend matches independently of most
external factors. On the contrary, pay-at-the-gate spectators
seem to be significantly affected by TV broadcasting of the
respective match. Empirical data suggests a reduction of ap-
proximately 30% of attendance through the broadcast, while
this figure only counts for home pay-at-the-gate support-
ers, with away supporters being uninfluenced despite their
higher cost of attendance. A possible explanation for this is
that away supporters are above-average loyal and are often
STHs themselves for their respective home matches. The
reduction of attendance through TV broadcasting plays an
important role for the home team. It does not only lose a sig-
nificant share of ticket revenue, as merchandising revenues,
which are mainly driven by pay-at-the-gate spectators, de-
crease as well. Nevertheless, clubs normally receive higher
incomes through TV broadcasting, which may neutralize the
effect described before. While the effects found by Allan were
based on data from the Scottish Premier League, it is likely
that they hold for most other sports leagues as well. Forrest
et al. (2005) showed that “the whole of the variance in [. . . ]
demand models comes from those who pay for tickets on a
game-by-game basis”, confirming Allan’s findings.
As this implies that STHs represent the majority of “reli-
able demand”, it seems like renewal of STHs’ tickets should
be one of the main objectives for teams to maintain and in-
crease demand for attendance at their games. McDonald
(2010) found that “ratings of the on-field performance of
the club are almost identical between those [STHs] who re-
newed and those wo did not”. He also found that years of
membership and number of games attended highly correlate
with renewals of season tickets, which seems intuitive. As
STHs “appear to value the connection they form with the club
highly”, which boosts satisfaction and reduces the probabil-
ity of churning, clubs have to focus on building a loyal STH
fan base to avoid churning season ticket amounts. The risk
of losing a STH is highest in the first three years, especially
the first, so special attention has to be paid to newly acquired
STHs.
3.4. Interdependencies
Neale (1964) highlighted several peculiarities of sports
leagues in comparison to traditional industries, which are
important to consider when thinking about a league’s rev-
enue sharing system. His most relevant findings regarding
this topic are briefly introduced in the following. The Louis-
Schmelling Paradox describes the phenomenon that an over-
dominant team loses fan interest through boredom and low
uncertainty of outcome. As an extreme example, if Bayern
Munich buys every player in the Bundesliga, there are no
opponents, no competition and no matches to earn income
from. As a consequence, monopolies in sports leagues are not
profit maximizing for the monopolist, contrary to other in-
dustries. This is based on the Inverted Joint Product, through
which two firms (teams) create a product (the match) to-
gether. The Roger Maris Cobweb describes the fact that the
demand for a team or player depends on the respective per-
formance in the previous year. As an example, if a club sur-
prisingly becomes league champion in a season, but performs
averagely again in the season afterwards, the demand for its
games will be higher than it would have been after a “nor-
mal” season. These phenomena are important to consider
when thinking about the potential demand for a match or a
league.
According to Borland and MacDonald (2003) paper on
demand for sport, there are several interdependencies be-
tween demand and other factors surrounding a sports con-
test. Their first finding is that uncertainty of outcome, which
is enhanced through competitive balance, seems to increase
intra-seasonal and inter-seasonal demand. This is an impor-
tant finding as demand is related to the majority of team ob-
jectives – leading to the consequence that competitive bal-
ance is also an important factor when trying to match a team’s
objectives. Secondly, a higher contest quality increases fan
interest and attendance at the game, meaning that, as an ex-
ample, a perfectly balanced amateur league is much less de-
manded than a perfectly balanced professional league. This
relationship introduces a trade-off between competitive bal-
ance and quality of play in some situations: leagues must
decide what to focus on in order to maximize demand. Their
third finding says that quality of viewing strongly matters
for attendance, while the fourth one states that there is a
price sensitivity of spectators. Finally, Borland et al. found
that TV broadcasts as potential substitute for attendance at a
game might matter, although they acknowledged that more
research is required to sketch out the exact impacts and rela-
tionships.
However, these findings are hard to generalize determi-
nants of demand for sports as spectators can differ heav-
ily in their interests and behaviour. As an example, Dom-
izio (2013) found that the “Italian couch potato” does not
seem to be significantly more interested in TV broadcasts
of games with a higher outcome uncertainty. At the same
time, Forrest et al. (2005) found that broadcasters and the
TV audience tend to “favour matches [. . . ] expected to be
close”. Schreyer et al. showed that both German season
ticket holders (Schreyer et al. (2016a)) and German TV au-
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diences (Schreyer et al. (2016b)) tend to prefer Bundesliga
matches with a high outcome uncertainty. Additionally, Ger-
man fans seem to slightly prefer those matches of the En-
glish Premier League that have a high uncertainty of outcome
(D. Schreyer et al. (2016)b). These examples show that,
while there are some overarching trends and coherences, au-
diences across the globe have their own oddities in viewing
behaviour. Additionally, there are differences between the
behaviour of audiences in stadiums and through broadcast-
ing.
Cox (2018) attempted to build a consensus view on the
question whether the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis
(UOH)9 should be rejected or accepted. His findings show
that the UOH for physical stadium attendance can be re-
futed, which confirms the views of Forrest et al. (2005).
Therefore, spectators attending the match in the stadium
seem to favour certain outcomes. However, there seems to
be a significant difference to the TV audience, as the UOH
holds when analysing broadcasting audiences, again simi-
larly to Forrest et al. (2005). Consequently, it is important
to consider the potential movements in both physical and
broadcasting demand when implementing means, such as a
TV revenue sharing system, that aim at promoting competi-
tive balance. As our conclusion primarily deals with demand
from TV audiences, we assume that the UOH holds in this
case.
In his 2001 paper, Szymanski analysed the consequences
of a growing inequality of resources between clubs, which
seems to be a persistent trend in the last decades. Based on
his data set of English football, there seems to be a weak,
but significant negative impact of growing inequality on at-
tendance. This decline in demand is likely caused by de-
clining competitive balance through growing gaps in finan-
cial resources. It is therefore important to note that an even
league, both financially and competitively, is likely to max-
imize attendance. In 2003, Szymanski published his paper
“The Economic Design of Team Sports Contests”, in which he
discussed several issues regarding professional team sports
setups. He summarizes with the statement that “empirically,
some fundamental issues remain unsolved”, mentioning ex-
amples such as the impact of outcome uncertainty on demand
and the optimal institutional design of team sports. However,
he concludes that finding the “optimal design of a sporting
contest [. . . ] is not beyond the capabilities of the economics
profession”, showing that there is more useful research to
be done in this field. Another important takeaway regard-
ing competitive balance was found by Mourão and Teixeira
(2015): “Everyone who is interested in enhancing the com-
petitive balance of soccer leagues must devote particular at-
tention to the dynamics of exogenous macroeconomic factors
[. . . ]”. In other words: in every discussion concerning com-
petitive balance, close attention has to be paid to external
factors, as these are able to impair findings significantly.
9Saying that games with uncertain outcomes are more likely to be de-
manded by spectators
4. Means to Enhance Professional Team Sports Leagues
4.1. Chapter Overview
In the history of professional sports leagues, there has
been an ongoing discussion regarding the appropriateness of
different means to increase competitive balance and drive de-
mand in a league. While an analysis of each mean is a topic
on its own, the most prominent ones, with a focus on rev-
enue sharing mechanisms, will be briefly introduced in the
following. It is not clear whether these measures actually en-
hance competitive balance, as Rottenberg’s Invariance Prin-
ciple argues that such interventions do not affect a league’s
talent allocation, and, as a consequence, its degree of com-
petitive balance. However, these mechanisms can still lead
to interesting considerations regarding the appropriateness
of revenue sharing mechanisms.
4.2. TV Revenue Sharing – Definition and Impact
TV Revenue Sharing is one of the most prominent com-
petitive balance measures and is used by the majority of
sports leagues worldwide. It describes the collective sale of
broadcast rights of a leagues, e.g. to a broadcaster like Sky
Sports. In contrary to a system where broadcasting rights are
sold per team or per game, TV revenue sharing allocates the
funds generated by the sale back to all teams in the league.
This allocation usually follows a certain key, for example the
Bundesliga’s new four-pillar revenue sharing model. Exem-
plary criteria that are being used for this allocation are past
competitive success, market-value based metrics and figures
that measure the team’s contribution to the development of
the respective league. However, instead of using a special
distribution key, some leagues distribute revenues equally to
all clubs within the respective league. TV revenue sharing is
seen as necessary measure in most leagues as the wealth-
iest and strongest clubs in a league usually generate well
above-average spectatorship. The broadcast of matches of
smaller clubs with substandard team strengths are usually
not demanded in the same dimension. If every club would
receive the TV revenue directly generated by them, larger
clubs would consequently become even wealthier, drastically
decreasing competitive balance in the league. It is there-
fore usually not discussed whether there should be a TV rev-
enue sharing system, but how it should be designed. In their
1995 paper, Fort & Quirk concluded that “TV revenue shar-
ing per se should have no effect on competitive balance”, as
payments to clubs do not depend on each team’s competi-
tive success in equally allocating systems. Szymanski (2003)
summarized that revenue sharing has a neutral impact, con-
firming the Invariance Principle, explaining that the majority
of research in this field has been done on the general fea-
sibility of revenue sharing, while often ignoring the impact
of different allocation keys. Thus, there are no well-known
academic works on the impact of different revenue sharing
systems yet, although the exact impact of this mean highly
depends on the specific form that it is implemented in. Con-
sequently, this thesis tries to serve as a starting point for fur-
ther academic work in this field.
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4.3. Gate Revenue Sharing – Definition and Impact
Gate Revenue Sharing describes the sharing of revenues
directly generated through physical attendance of spectators
at the stadium. Usually, the visiting team receives a fixed
amount of the generated revenue, in contrast to the conven-
tional model where the home team fully receives all ticket
revenues. This measure aims at decreasing the advantage
of having a large venue and populous territory, as smaller
clubs with smaller fan bases get the chance to participate in
the infrastructural advantage of larger teams. The measure
is discussed controversially in academics as some works sug-
gest that gate revenue sharing actually reduces the degree of
competitive balance (Szymanski and Késenne (2004)), while
reducing the total investment in talent by teams. However,
some works related to the invariance principle argue that the
measure does not affect the degree of competitive balance
(Fort and Quirk (1995)) (Vrooman (1995)). The main dif-
ference in these contrary academic approaches is that those
works, who could not find an impact of revenue sharing on
competitive balance, took “a different assumption about the
derivative of the contest success function”. Therefore, it is
still not entirely clear whether this mean actually enhances
competitive balance. In practise, gate revenue sharing is
used in several American sports leagues, such as the National
F0otball League (NFL). In the Bundesliga, as usual in Eu-
ropean football leagues, the home team receives almost all
revenues generated through ticketing, meaning that no gate
revenue sharing is practised.
4.4. Other Means to Enhance Sports Leagues
Salary Caps, one of the most prominent competitive bal-
ance measures, limit the total amount of salaries that a club
can pay to its team to a certain amount. It also exists in
the form of a per player salary cap, that limits the amount
of salary a single player can earn per season. The ratio-
nale behind this is to balance out the overall salaries paid
by all teams in a league and, therefore, even out playing
strengths in the league. Academically, it is seen as one of
the best means to enhance competitive balance (Fort and
Quirk (1995)), however, it requires that there are no com-
peting leagues as profit-maximizing top players would likely
transfer to those leagues where their potential salary is not
cut. Therefore, an implementation in a European type sports
league is not likely to be successful in terms of maintain-
ing level of play while enhancing competitive balance. In
their 2012 paper, Dietl, Franck, Lang, & Rathke, confirmed
this assessment, before suggesting a percentage-of-revenue
salary cap as a possible compromise in European leagues.
Based on their assumptions, such a model could help pro-
ducing more balanced leagues, while decreasing aggregate
salary payments.
Progressive Tax Rates are another mean aiming at en-
hancing competitive balance in a sports league. In contrast
to a fixed tax rate, as it is used in most professional leagues
at the moment, a progressive tax rate creates asymmetric
changes in the marginal revenues or marginal costs of clubs
(Van Der Burg and Prinz (2005)). The respective effect
depends on whether the progressive tax is imposed on the
sports clubs’ revenues or their payroll, although both effects
would increase competitive balance. As by Van der Burg’s
model, the resulting tax proceeds would not get redistributed
to smaller clubs, as they would consequently have an inter-
est in larger clubs employing more talent or earning more
money. He found a progressive tax rate to be a superior
method to enhance competitive balance, while the tax rev-
enues generated can be used for other causes as an additional
bonus.
4.5. Main Takeaways
After analysing the most common forms of means that
aim to enhance competitive balance in professional sports
leagues, we can infer some useful takeaways. Although al-
most every mean tries to make the wealthiest and strongest
teams weaker (both financially and competitively), some
means redistribute the obtained resources to smaller clubs,
while others use them for investments in the league itself,
not necessarily helping any clubs directly. A redistribution to
smaller clubs intuitively makes sense, as the goal to enhance
competitive balance requires both larger clubs becoming
weaker and smaller clubs becoming stronger. However, such
a redistribution mechanism results in an interest of smaller
clubs in the economic and competitive success of larger clubs,
which has the potential to be harmful for competition. As
an example, if a smaller and a larger club both want to sign
a certain player, and competitive balance taxes are active
including a redistribution system, the smaller club has two
choices. The club can either sign the player, or not sign
the player and likely get a share of the larger club’s excess
salary spending through the tax. In the case that there is
no redistribution system, the club can either sign the player,
or not sign him, without any benefits. Therefore, a smaller
club would have more incentives to outbid the larger club in
a system without redistribution. However, a redistribution
mechanism still reallocates funds from wealthier to poorer
clubs, which can potentially increase a league’s competitive
balance. Hence, the exact impact of such a system is not
entirely clear.
Another important learning is that sharing mechanisms
in professional sports leagues can allocate funds to a league’s
teams in two ways. Firstly, they can be distributed based on
equal shares for all clubs, which is a system commonly used
in North American leagues. Secondly, funds can be allocated
by performance-based criteria, also known as “prize-like el-
ements” (Szymanski and Késenne (2004)), typical for Euro-
pean leagues. The exact impact of those sharing mechanisms
highly depend on the chosen allocation system, which is a
topic yet to be fully understood by academics.
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5. Comparison of the New Model with Other Sports
Leagues
5.1. Chapter Overview
This Chapter will be the foundation for an international
comparison of the Bundesliga’s new TV revenue sharing
model. After covering the revenue sharing models of the Bun-
desliga’s two large European competitors, Premier League
and La Liga10, as well as the US-American Major League
Soccer11, this paragraph also considers other sports leagues,
namely the Handball Bundesliga12 and National Football
League13. The Chapter will serve as external benchmark for
the assessment of the Bundesliga’s new system to determine
potential learnings from other sports leagues. To summa-
rize, it concludes with an overview of takeaways from other
leagues.
5.2. Revenue Sharing in the Premier League
The Premier League (PL), based in Great Britain and for-
merly known as Barclay’s Premier League, is often given the
title of the most popular football league in the world. While
there are several factors that set the Premier League apart,
such as a high quality of players, English as local language
and unique stadiums, the PL is often praised for its high per-
ceived competitive balance. It is a common opinion that “ev-
eryone can beat everyone” in the Premier League (T., 2015),
partly driven by the fact that almost all teams feature several
international star players. Another major reason for this high
outcome uncertainty is the distribution of the revenues the
PL receives through its large TV deals, such as the recently
closed one for the 2016-2019 period (cf. Figure 3).
At the moment, the revenue distributed to clubs includes
income from the sale of national and international central
broadcasting rights and other commercial rights. The Pre-
mier League calls its allocation mechanism, which was signed
by all initial clubs that formed the league in 1992, “the
most equitable of Europe’s major football leagues” (Premier
League (2016)). This is proven by a ratio of 1.52 to 1 be-
tween the top and bottom finishing clubs in the 2015/2016
season, which is the lowest ratio in the history of the PL, and
the lowest one of all major European football leagues (cf.
Figure 6).
On UK broadcasting level, 50% of revenues are equally
split between the 20 PL clubs. 25% are paid in merit pay-
ments, working as prize money per place in the table, which
works as a performance-based allocation mechanism. The re-
maining 25% of UK broadcast revenue are paid in facility fees
10Chosen because of their strong commercial success, which indicates
that the leagues are using feasible and demand-maximizing revenue sharing
mechanisms
11Chosen because of the fundamentally different league system, that may
serve as source for innovation
12Chosen because of the same geographical scope (Germany) and the sub-
sequentely similar spectator base
13Chosen because of the fundamentally different league system and strong
commercial success
each time that a team’s games are broadcast on TV14. All in-
ternational broadcast revenue, as well as central commercial
revenue, is split equally among all clubs, regardless of their
participation in international competitions. An overview of
the Premier League’s allocation system for the 2015/16 sea-
son can be found in the Appendix (cf. Figure 5)
Based on the recently signed TV deal for the next three
years, which consisted of approximately £5.5 billion of do-
mestic revenue and £3.2 billion of international revenue
(Totalsportek (2015)), ˜37% of TV revenues come from in-
ternational contracts. Therefore, the weighted average of
total TV revenues that are allocated equally to all teams is
˜68%
15. Consequently, only 32% of the model are (some-
how) based on performance-related metrics. This only
weakly performance-based system boosts financial and com-
petitive equality in the Premier League, hence enhancing
competitive balance. As English (and international) spec-
tators seem to care about a high uncertainty of outcome
(Forrest et al. (2005), cf. Chapter 3.5), demand and fan
interest are likely to increase as well. This again leads to
even more profitable TV deals, building a logical loop that
enhances club finances, competitive balance and demand
(cf. Figure 10).
5.3. Revenue Sharing in La Liga
The Spanish football league La Liga, also referred to as
Primera División and La Liga Santander, is one of the most
successful football leagues globally. The league features two
of the world’s most prestigious football clubs, FC Barcelona
(FCB) and Real Madrid (RM), and has been dominating Eu-
ropean football in the last years. The league has the highest
UEFA coefficient16 at the moment, which has been perma-
nently reflected in the international competitive success of
Spanish clubs. In the last three seasons17, both Champions
League and Europa League were won exclusively by La Liga
teams.
In the past, TV revenue distribution in La Liga has been
extremely uneven: Teams had the right to negotiate their
own TV contracts and consequently, top clubs generated
much higher incomes than bottom-of-the-league teams (cf.
Figure 6). The model was introduced with the 1997/87 sea-
son, and was a counter model to the systems used in other
European football leagues, and the majority of sports leagues
worldwide (McMahon (2015)). It finally led to widening fi-
nancial gaps in the league, decreasing competitive balance
and increasing the top teams’ advantages even more. Even
leading clubs, besides FCB and RM, suffered through this
system: In 2015, Atletico Madrid, one of Spain’s best teams,
earned less TV revenue than the club who came last in the
14Each club is entitled to a minimum of ten facility fees per season (The
Guardian (2012))
15£5.5/(£5.5+£3.2) * 50% + £3.2/(£5.5+£3.2) * 100% = ˜68%
16The UEFA coefficient is a figure used to allocate participation slots for
leagues, based on their past performance in international competitions, such
as the Champions League
172013/14 to 2015/16
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Premier League (Heckle (2015)). Consequently, several
critics raised concerns about the feasibility of the league’s
revenue sharing system.
In 2015, La Liga’s existing system was replaced through
an intervention of the Spanish government, establishing a
new system similar to the Premier League’s model (McMahon
(2015)). While 7% of both domestic and oversea revenues
are reserved for several smaller causes18 and 10% are trans-
ferred to Spain’s second league, 83% go to La Liga teams.
Within the amount allocated to La Liga teams, 50% are dis-
tributed equally among all teams, 25% are “merit money”
based on how clubs performed in the last 5 years, and 25%
of the sum are distributed based on resource generation abil-
ity of clubs. Additional consequences of the new system are
a mandatory maximum ratio between the highest and lowest
paid club of 4.5 to 119, as well as a provision that requires
clubs to prioritize paying debts owed to the government.
The recent change in La Liga’s allocation system shows
that an individual sale of TV rights is not feasible in the long
run, as large clubs tend to earn multiple times the TV in-
come of smaller clubs. Part of the new mechanism’s vision
was to ensure that no club gets less income than it got with
the existing system, while the majority of clubs should get
more income than before. This movement was made possi-
ble through a new domestic TV deal worth € 2.65 billion for
the 2016-2019 seasons, which significantly boosted La Liga’s
total earnings (Totalsportek (2016)). There is no empirical
evidence on the effectiveness of the new system yet, as it was
just recently implemented and competitive balance measures
are influenced by a variety of factors, and not exclusively by
the TV revenue sharing model.
5.4. Revenue Sharing in the Major League Soccer
The Major League Soccer (MLS) is USA’s prime football,
in the US referred to as soccer, league. Although the sport
was dominated by the “Big Four” leagues20 in the country
in the last decades (Heitner (2015)), the league has been
growing quickly in the last years. This has been reflected by
double digit growth in a variety of dimensions, e.g. atten-
dance, sponsorship deals and live broadcasting. While only
98 games were broadcasted on TV in 2014, all 340 games
are on live TV today. The increasing relevance of the MLS
can also be observed by the recent transfers of international
star players such as Steven Gerrard, Bastian Schweinsteiger
or Sebastian Giovinco to the league.
The Major League Soccer is organized differently com-
pared to most football leagues: Clubs, known as so-called
franchises, are owned by private team owners, who are vot-
ing shareholders of the league itself. If a franchise signs up
a player, he usually signs the contract with the MLS, who
18Including parachute payments for relegated clubs, league overheads and
grassroots initiatives (McMahon (2015))
193.5 to 1 in case that revenues exceed $1.6 billion per season
20American Football (NFL), Baseball (MLB), Basketball (NBA) and Hockey
(USHL)
controls franchises’ finances and has the possibility to inter-
vene. Consequently, contrary to European football leagues,
the MLS has implemented several mechanisms to enhance
competitive balance: a draft system, a salary cap, and rev-
enue sharing, which are all popular means used in North
American leagues (Taylor (2015)). The MLS has historically
been unprofitable, which is bound to change in the next years
due to the strong growth.
After a relatively unprofitable TV deal in the beginning of
the 2010’s, the MLS signed a new 8-year broadcasting agree-
ment with several TV channels in 2014. The deal as a whole
is reportedly paying a combined sum of $90 million per year,
which roughly tripled the previous deal (Smith (2014)). The
MLS has a “central sponsorship and broadcast rights strategy”
(Taylor (2015)), expressed through a reciprocal support sys-
tem between league and teams. The exact financial system
is not disclosed; however, it is known that there are various
revenue streams being passed on from league to teams and
vice versa. Due to the league’s special structure, the league
pays for player salaries and travel costs, while teams transfer
a percentage of their income, e.g. from tickets, to the league
to cover those operating expenses. As the franchises legally
belong to the league, all league revenues are shared by the
teams. In addition, clubs have the possibility to sell their own
local sponsorships. This system significantly differs from Eu-
ropean revenue sharing and can only be maintained through
the special ownership and franchise structure in the United
States. Although it is impossible to establish a similar sys-
tem in Europe (cf. Chapter 3.2.2), it is notable that, while
there are several factors contributing to this trend, the strong
growth of the MLS is driven by this special sharing model.
5.5. Revenue Sharing in the National Football League
The National Football League (NFL) is the USA’s Ameri-
can football league and is widely considered as largest profes-
sional sports league in the world, both financially and reach-
wise. As American football is a sport mainly played in the
USA, it is also the most relevant league in this sport glob-
ally, by far. In 2016, total revenues were projected to sur-
pass $13 billion (Belzer (2016)), up by more than 50% from
201021. This figure compares to a yearly total revenue of
about $10 billion in the Major League Baseball (Nightengale
(2016)), and to roughly $4 billion in the Premier League
(Wilson (2016)), which has the highest total revenue of all
football leagues. The Super Bowl, which is the annual cham-
pionship game of the NFL, is regarded as one of the biggest
sports events in the world. In the last years, the event had
an annual TV viewership in the US only of over 100 million
people (Statista (2017)). Although it can already be consid-
ered as the world’s leading professional sports league, the
NFL plans to continue its remarkable growth, having set its
2027 total revenue goal to $25 billion.
In the recently completed 2016 season, the 32 NFL teams
21Total revenues in 2010 summed up to approximately $8.5 billion
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shared about $7.1 billion22 in national revenue, consisting of
“national sponsorships, broadcast deals, licensing and mer-
chandise sales” (Novy-Williams (2016)). The national rev-
enue is split roughly equally among all teams (Atkinson et al.
(1988)), leading to an income of approximately $223 million
per team for the respective fiscal year. The NFL follows a sim-
ilar franchise system for clubs like the MLS (see 5.4), where
clubs are owned by the league. Therefore, it is possible for
the league to implement a balanced allocation mechanism
like this without significant resistance of those clubs, who
would be better off with an individual sale of broadcasting
rights. In addition to the equal sharing of TV revenues, the
NFL practises in heavy gate revenue sharing, as 40% of all
ticket revenues are distributed to the away team. The system
is often perceived as remarkable because it resembles a so-
cialist idea in one of the most capitalistic countries, and still
works well overall (Bloom (2014)).
5.6. Revenue Sharing in the Handball-Bundesliga
The DKB Handball-Bundesliga (HBL) is Germany’s prime
handball league. While football is the most popular sport
in Germany without a doubt, handball only plays a minor
role in terms of average spectators and media coverage. To
elucidate this by an example, all Handball Bundesliga teams
sold 1.3 million tickets in total in the 2015/16 season (DKB
(2017)), while Borussia Dortmund alone sold 1.4 million
(Kicker (2017)) in the same period of time.
In November 2016, the HBL announced the sale of a
new domestic broadcasting rights package to the German
TV channels Sky (Pay-TV), ARD and ZDF (both public TV
channels). The deal includes live broadcasting of the first
two leagues, the DHB-Pokal (domestic cup) and several other
competitions23. Although there are no official details regard-
ing the volume of the agreement, estimates range from€ 3 to
€ 5.5 million (Beck (2017)). When comparing this Figure to
the dimensions of football TV deals, it becomes evident that
handball plays in a significantly lower financial dimension.
This leads to an important conclusion: while gate revenue
only represents a minor share of football clubs’ income nowa-
days due to large TV deals, it is still a major income factor
for handball clubs as TV deals are significantly smaller. Addi-
tionally, the HBL’s new deal does not primarily serve as direct
income boost, but rather as opportunity to further market the
sport in Germany. While the HBL centrally sells its broadcast-
ing rights, there is no exact allocation key publicly available.
Mr. Schmedt, Vice President of the HBL, recently pleaded to
distribute the new funds to specific, useful purposes, e.g. de-
velopment of the sport, upgrades of infrastructure or youth
centres.
5.7. Learnings from Other Sports Leagues
After comparing the (TV) revenue sharing models in sev-
eral sports leagues worldwide, there are some interesting
22This overall revenue Figure is extrapolated from the publicly owned
Green Bay Packers’ financial statements
23Namely the REWE Final Fours, the PIXUM Super Cup and the All Star
Game
findings regarding the impact of these systems. Unfortu-
nately, it is not possible to compare the effectiveness of the
different mechanisms empirically, as the leagues differ highly
in their initial situations, league compositions and gover-
nance. Furthermore, some revenue sharing systems have
been introduced just recently, so their impact cannot be mea-
sured at this point in time yet. Still, a qualitative comparison
of mechanisms and repercussions is useful for the assessment
of the Bundesliga’s new four-pillar system.
The Premier League is an example of how a relatively
equal allocation key can create a perceivably balanced, at-
tractive league. The league is perceived as one of football’s
most balanced, and, to a big part because of that, very pop-
ular around the world. This leads to a high demand and
rapidly growing TV revenues, making the league even more
interesting as teams can use these revenues to buy additional
star players and develop their infrastructure. It seems that al-
most all PL teams are satisfied with the system as they are all
rewarded with increasing broadcasting incomes. However,
the league’s clubs only managed to win two European cup ti-
tles since the 2008/2009 season24, while the La Liga’s teams
won ten titles in the same period of time. This, among multi-
ple other reasons, can be seen as a sign of insufficient funding
of the PL’s top clubs, caused by the league’s revenue sharing
system.
The Spanish La Liga serves as a good example of what
happens when broadcasting rights are not sold collectively, as
usual in football, but individually. Before the reform in 2015,
top-to-bottom income ratios were the highest in Europe (cf.
Figure 6), and the demand for matches not featuring the
league’s top teams was very low. This led to smaller domestic
TV deals in comparison to the Premier League, which again
weakened all, especially small, teams in La Liga. However,
as mentioned before, the leading La Liga teams have been
extremely successful on a European basis. As the old individ-
ual marketing system has been abolished and replaced with a
mechanism similar to the PL’s, we can infer that an individual
rights sale system is not feasible in the long run in European
football. However, such a system appears to lead to a small
number of extremely strong clubs, which can be a goal to aim
for under some circumstances.
Although this matter certainly has to be examined further
to draw significant conclusions, we can observe a trade-off
between a balanced, in demand league with mediocre inter-
national success and an imbalanced league with few domi-
nating teams, which are internationally successful. This is a
trend to consider when thinking about the Bundesliga’s po-
tential development in the next years.
While both observed US-American Leagues, MLS and
NFL, are structured fundamentally different through the
franchise, closed-league system, we can observe some in-
teresting developments. The NFL engages in the imaginable
most equal way of TV revenue sharing: every team (roughly)
gets the same share of the collectively sold deal. This, among
242011/12 UEFA Champions League (FC Chelsea) and 2012/13 Europa
League (FC Chelsea)
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other reasons, makes the league balanced and unpredictable,
proven e.g. through the fact that there were 8 different Super
Bowl winners in the last 9 seasons25. Similarly to the Premier
League, this leads to a circle of rapidly rising broadcasting
incomes through increasing demand, which again leads to
an even better and balanced league with profitable teams
(Forbes (2016)). Although the MLS’ exact revenue sharing
and allocation mechanisms are not publicly disclosed, the
league seems to follow a similar system of equal sharing.
While football was a fringe sport in the US a few years ago, it
continues to grow quickly and becomes increasingly relevant.
This can be seen as a sign that an even revenue distribution
can work in football, too. However, these conclusions must
be treated with caution, as the US-American system allows
for several mechanisms which are not feasible in European
football (cf. Chapter 5.4).
Finally, the Handball Bundesliga does not give us any in-
sights of the effectiveness of revenue sharing systems, due to
the incomparable size and unknown allocation mechanisms.
However, we can derive some interesting thoughts from the
league’s vision. The HBL sees TV deals as an opportunity to
promote the league and sport further, instead of (only) max-
imizing broadcasting revenue. This could be a starting point
for further research on the question whether it makes sense to
prefer rather unprofitable TV deals with high reach to rather
profitable 0nes with low reach, to maximize long-term de-
mand, and, consequently, future revenues. Additionally, the
HBL follows an approach to reinvest revenues into the devel-
opment of the sport. This may be a potential approach for
other sports leagues too, as an addition or alternative to a
purely monetary return for league and teams.
6. Assessment of the Bundesliga’s TV Revenue Sharing
Model
6.1. Chapter Overview
In the following Chapter, the Bundesliga’s new revenue
sharing model is assessed based on the league’s current situ-
ation, its international positioning, and its potential strategic
aims. After forming three objectives based on the league’s
aims, potential ways to tackle these aims using revenue shar-
ing are introduced. Finally, we evaluate the reformed model
based on its capacities to contribute to the Bundesliga’s over-
all strategy. We conclude the thesis with several starting
points for further improvement of the system.
6.2. Current Situation
To be able to assess the Bundesliga’s new TV revenue
sharing model, it is of high importance to understand the
league’s current situation in terms of competitive balance,
league structure and financials. In the 2015/16 season, the
18 1. Bundesliga clubs generated total revenues of€ 3.2 bil-
lion (DFL (2017)), which is a record number for the league
25Based on Super Bowl XLIII (2009) to LI (2017)
and an increase of about 24% to the previous season. Out
of this Figure, € 933 million was received through media
marketing, meaning a 29% share26. At the same time, those
clubs earned a total net profit of about € 206 million, show-
ing that most clubs operate profitably, contrary to other foot-
ball leagues, e.g. the MLS. It is notable that the revenue
share of media marketing differs between clubs of different
strengths. While the top six clubs in terms of paid salaries
generate 26.5% of their revenues through media on average,
the middle six clubs compare with 27.4%, and the bottom
clubs with 40.2%27. This shows that media income seems to
be a more important revenue stream for financially smaller
clubs, making them more sensitive and dependent on this in-
come source. However, one has to note that this is based on
the fact that revenues are shared. If a smaller club would sell
its TV rights individually, the demand would likely be so low
that the media share of income would be significantly lower
than currently observed.
When analysing the structure of teams, the most notice-
able one certainly is Bayern Munich, that has been dominat-
ing the league for the last decades, consequently being the
record champion of the league. Since the 1998/1999 season,
the club won 12 out of 18 seasons, showing its strong dom-
inance. Munich has been accused of “destroying the league
through transfers”, fuelled by its recent transfers of star play-
ers of competitors, such as R. Lewandowski or M. Hummels.
These transfers were made possible through the financial and
competitive superiority of the club, and led to several critical
voices from Germany and abroad, stating that the Bundesliga
is a boring, one-team league.
Borussia Dortmund, a typical German Traditionsverein,
played an important role in the league as well in the last
years, as it was Munich’s strongest rival in several compe-
titions. However, the club’s weaker infrastructure, finances,
and team make it seem impossible that the gap between the
two teams will close in the near future.
Another club important to mention is RB Leipzig, a club
backed by the Austrian company Red Bull. Although the club
just recently played in the third league, it was promoted to
1. Bundesliga in the 2016/17 season and immediately per-
formed so well, that it qualified for the Champions League.
There is strong criticism regarding the club’s origin and
financing, as many fans in Germany perceive the club to
be artificial, commercially-oriented and lacking tradition.
Through its financial background, Leipzig was able to spend
significantly more for transfers than it earned, making the
team a potential title candidate in the next years.
Besides those clubs, the Bundesliga seems to be balanced
relatively well for a European sports league type, with several
groups of clubs normally competing for European cup qualifi-
cation spots, mid-table spots and avoidance of relegation. In
the ongoing 2016/17 season, many potentially weaker clubs
26An exact split of the Bundesliga’s revenue can be found in the Appendix
(cf. Figure 7)
27Top six: 88.157/333.234=26.5%, middle six: 34.153/124.873=27.4%,
bottom six: 33.241/82.615=40.2%
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managed to finish in the upper half of the table, while some
traditionally well-performing clubs found themselves in the
bottom table half. This arguably shows that, besides the uni-
lateral situation at the top of the league, the Bundesliga is rel-
atively balanced in terms of playing strengths. An overview
of performances in the last seasons (cf. Figure 8) and cur-
rent total market values (cf. Figure 9) can be found in the
Appendix.
In 2010, Pawlowski, Breuer, & Hovemann (Pawlowski
et al. (2010)) highlighted the issue of a decreasing competi-
tive balance in the top five European football leagues. Based
on their observations, this phenomenon is based on the fact
that successful clubs can participate in the profitable UEFA
Champions League (UCL), that pays out large sums to its
participants, who can then strengthen their teams even fur-
ther. This leads to a vicious circle (or blessing for top teams),
where the same teams participate in the UCL permanently,
widening the gap between cup participants and smaller clubs
in their respective domestic leagues. This is an important
mechanism to consider when thinking about the allocation
of domestic TV revenues, as these do not represent the full
media incomes of internationally competing clubs.
6.3. Aims and Strategic Positioning
To assess the actual feasibility of the new system, it is fi-
nally important to discuss the aim of the system, based on the
current situation of the league. After the introduction of the
new system, Mr. Rauball, president of the DFL, stated that
the new model would be in the interest of media partners,
spectators in the stadiums and broadcasting audiences, as
it promotes an attractive competition (Sportschau (2016)).
He added that the system aims to develop the Bundesliga
in a positive way through appreciation of sustainability and
work with young talents, connecting meritocracy and solidar-
ity. An attractive competition is hard to define, however, it is
likely that attractiveness relates to the maximization of de-
mand and an attractive competition relates to a high degree
of competitive balance. At the same time, meritocracy aims
at rewarding those who perform well, and solidarity aims at
coherence and mutual support between the league members.
To find the correct answer to the question on how to
achieve the goals formulated by Mr. Rauball, it is useful
to briefly analyse the Bundesliga’s competitive standing and
image in comparison to its direct competitors. The Premier
League has the clear unique selling point (USP) of a balanced
league with constant quality across all teams, while La Liga
features the arguably best two teams in the world and some
of football’s best players. The French Ligue 1 and the Ital-
ian Serie A seem to be stuck in the middle, as they do not
have any clear qualities that other leagues do not have. Al-
though the Bundesliga is neither known for equality of play-
ing strengths nor outstanding individual teams and players,
it has some other USPs. Firstly, it leads in terms of stadium at-
tendance and is known for great atmospheres and fans. Sec-
ondly, the league is known for its international success in cup
competitions. While only Bayern Munich managed to win
an European cup in the last years, the Bundesliga currently
ranks second in the UEFA ranking (UEFA (2017)). Finally,
the league is known for its youth work. Contrary to leagues
like the Premier League, the Bundesliga features a large num-
ber of players born and trained in Germany, resulting in har-
monic, tactically excellent teams.
When thinking about how to leverage those USPs to
clearly position the league in the market for football and
maximize demand, it becomes evident that it is not possible
to rule out La Liga’s position as leader in quality of players
and top teams due to a lack of prestigious clubs and financial
resources. However, it is indeed possible to aim for the Pre-
mier League’s image of a quality league with high uncertainty
of outcome, as the Bundesliga is already relatively balanced
and features several star players. One could argue that what
currently hinders the Bundesliga from being perceived as
balanced is the presence of Bayern Munich, which is interna-
tionally seen as too dominant on several dimensions. If the
league would manage to equalize Bayern Munich’s strength
with its main competitors Dortmund and Leipzig, a signif-
icant increase in demand is imaginable. Furthermore, the
average quality and market value of teams and players (total
market value of € 2.63 billion, (Transfermarkt.de (2017a)))
is not seen as strong as in the Premier League (€ 4.91 bil-
lion) and La Liga (€ 3.64 billion). Finally, it seems that
the competitiveness of clubs within the middle and bottom
regions of the Bundesliga has room for further potential.
While the Bundesliga is one of the most balanced leagues in
Europe (Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, & University
of Tübingen (2013)), bottom-of-the-table clubs in Germany,
like Darmstadt 98, usually do not sign any valuable players
due to their lack of financial resources. Comparing this to
the Premier League, where those clubs can buy star players
for several million pounds and outbid top five Bundesliga
clubs for players, it becomes evident that the Bundesliga still
needs to enhance financial and competitive balance within
the league. Overall, it seems that the Bundesliga can move
into a more profitable and demanded strategic league po-
sition by (1) further decreasing financial and competitive
inequalities between clubs, (2) increasing its average player
and team quality and (3) balancing out Bayern Munich’s
dominance to make a suspenseful title race possible again.
However, one has to keep in mind that these aims are based
on the assumptions and claims in this chapter, and do not
represent universal truths about the state of the Bundesliga.
6.4. Strategy Implementation and Theoretical Revenue
Sharing Design
6.4.1. Enhancement of Financial and Competitive Balance
As income through media, such as TV revenues, is one of
the main drivers of clubs’ revenues, there is a large impact of
the league’s TV revenue sharing system on the clubs’ finances.
Finances again are an important driver of team strength, as
more money generally provides the ability to sign better play-
ers. The balance of team strengths, and consequently team
finances, are the definition of competitive balance. To de-
termine the influence of a revenue sharing system in profes-
sional team sports on the competitive balance in a league,
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an economic model is necessary. In the following, a system
that is able to determine the effects of equal-share-based and
performance-based revenue sharing systems on the financial
and competitive balance within a league is introduced. The
model is based on several assumptions that are elaborated in
the following. Therefore, the findings should be treated with
caution. However, the model illustrates the effects of differ-
ent revenue sharing approaches on the competitive balance
in a sports league. These findings help us in determining the
feasibility of the Bundesliga’s new revenue sharing system for
strategic aim (1).
We assume that a team’s quality and playing strength in
a season t are perfectly mapped by the total market value
(MVt) of its players. Under the assumptions that teams op-
erate equally profitable and TV revenue is the only source of
income, their market value increases each season by reinvest-
ing the profit margin (i) of the team’s last TV revenue (Rt-1),
in other words, the team’s residual income.
MVt = MVt−1 + i ∗ Rt−1 (1)
The TV revenue (Rt) that is distributed to a team is mainly
based on the league’s total TV revenue (LRt), as this is the
sum that is allocated to the clubs. We divide the sharing
mechanisms into a performance based share (SP), that rests
upon a past performance indicator (P), and an equal share
(SE), that allocates the respective sum equally to all (T)
teams in the league.
Rt = LRt ∗SP ∗P+ LRt ∗SE ∗ 1T = LRt ∗(SP ∗P+SE ∗
1
T
) (2)
with SP + SE = 1.
If we now insert the formula for an individual team’s rev-
enue (2.1) into the formula for a team’s market value (1), we
get the following:
MVt = MVt−1 + i ∗ LRt−1 ∗ (SP ∗ P + SE ∗ 1T ) (3)
with SP + SE = 1.
Using this approach, we can test for repercussions of dif-
ferent revenue sharing systems, as we are able to alternate
the shares that are allocated performance-based and equally.
We can now compare two teams, a stronger Team A and a
weaker Team B, which have significant differences in market
values (MVt-1) and, as performance depends on market val-
ues, past performances (P). To determine their ratio in mar-
ket value as a proxy for disparity (Dt-1) between the teams,
we take
Dt−1 =
MVt−1;A
MVt−1;B
(4)
with MVt−1;A ≥ MVt−1;B and PA ≥ PB.
In a perfectly even revenue sharing system (SE = 1 and
SP = 0), competitive balance after one season would amount
to
Dt;E =
MV t;A
MV t;B
=
MV t−1;A+ i ∗ LRt−1 ∗
 
1 ∗ 1T

MV t−1;B + i ∗ LRt−1 ∗
 
1 ∗ 1T
 (5)
with MVt−1;A > MVt−1;B. Contrary, if funds are solely allo-
cated by past performance (SE = 1 and SP = 0), competitive
balance after one season would amount to
Dt;P =
MV t;A
MV t;B
=
MV t−1;A+ i ∗ LRt−1 ∗ (1 ∗ PA )
MV t−1;B + i ∗ LRt−1 ∗ (1 ∗ PB ) (6)
with MV t−1;A > MV t−1;B and PA > PB. Comparing these
results28, we can detect that
MV t−1;A+ i ∗ LRt−1 ∗ (1 ∗ PA )
MV t−1;B + i ∗ LRt−1 ∗ (1 ∗ PB ) >
MV t;A
MV t;B
>
MV t−1;A+ i ∗ LRt−1 ∗ (1 ∗ 1T )
MV t−1;B + i ∗ LRt−1 ∗ (1 ∗ 1T )
(7)
Therefore, we can conclude that
Dt;P > Dt−1 > Dt;E
In other words, the approach shows that, under the given
assumptions, solely performance-based revenue sharing
widens the gap between two differently strong teams, while
perfectly equal revenue sharing narrows the gap. Therefore,
disparity in our example is lowest, when revenues are shared
equally among teams. However, the model can only be seen
as approximation to the matter as we based it on several
assumptions, which do not always precisely hold in reality.
We can transfer the learnings of this model to the Bun-
desliga’s current situation, yielding the result that the DFL
should try to implement as much equal-sharing components
as possible to decrease the current economic and competitive
imbalances in the league.
6.4.2. Increase of Game Quality and Team Values
After discussing the impact of revenue sharing systems
on competitive balance, it is now important to analyse the
potential impact of those mechanisms on game quality and
team values, as our second objective is to increase both.
Based on previous Chapters and our analyses of compet-
ing football leagues, we found that there seems to be a logical
cycle of even revenue sharing systems in some leagues, e.g.
in Premier League and NFL. In the case of even revenue sys-
tems, which allocate funds to all clubs primarily on an equal
basis, the league becomes more and more balanced, hence
increasing uncertainty of outcome. This, as a consequence,
increases demand for TV audiences (cf. Chapter 4.5) and re-
sults in an increasing viewership. A larger demand for broad-
casts means more income for broadcasters, and therefore a
higher willingness to pay for a TV deal, increasing the con-
tract’s value. As the value of the new, larger TV deal gets
equally allocated among all clubs again, the league becomes
even more balanced. Additionally, the increase in demand
and deal value transfers more absolute income to the league,
making it possible to spend more on players. Therefore, an
even revenue sharing system enhances both competitive bal-
ance and team values (cf. Figure 10).
28Proof for this equation can be found in the Appendix
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On the contrary, uneven revenue sharing systems, like the
abolished mechanism in La Liga, consequently yields oppos-
ing results. If revenues are shared based on an unequal basis,
for example past performance, top clubs receive more income
than smaller clubs. As a consequence, top clubs can even
further develop their competitive advantage and are likely
to become even stronger. Therefore, uncertainty of outcome
and competitive balance decrease, making TV audiences less
interested. Hence, demand and viewership both diminish,
resulting in less profitable broadcasters and smaller TV deals
in comparison to equal revenue sharing. Less lucrative TV
contracts decrease the overall payment to the league, which
lowers the clubs’ ability to sign valuable players. Out of the
already smaller new TV deal, an overproportional amount is
again given to larger clubs, widening the financial and com-
petitive gap within the league even more. Thus, we can see
that an uneven revenue sharing system results in a vicious
circle yielding lower competitive balance and slower growth
of team values (cf. Figure 11).
As media income only represents a fraction of clubs’ in-
comes (cf. Chapter 6.2), both cycles just discussed only de-
scribe the theoretical connection between competitive bal-
ance, revenue sharing, demand and player quality. There-
fore, our findings for now only hold when all other vari-
ables are held constant. Based on the assumption that the
uncertainty of outcome hypothesis holds for TV audiences
(cf. Chapter 4.5) and those audiences demand leagues with
higher outcome uncertainty, we can infer some important
findings. An even, or equally-based, revenue sharing system
does not only lead to payoffs that promote a higher financial
balance within the league, but also tends to increase TV deal
values and the league’s overall quality.
6.4.3. Reduction of Bayern Munich’s Dominance
We finally need to analyse how it is theoretically possible
to reduce a single team’s dominance through revenue shar-
ing, without harming the basic principle of meritocracy. Al-
though it is clearly a possibility to engage in perfectly equal
revenue sharing, such as in the NFL, and consequently not
paying more funds to more dominant than to weaker teams,
we want to focus on opportunities in performance-based sys-
tems. These yield more realistic results, as most European
revenue sharing systems contain performance-based criteria,
and gives us several approaches on how to tackle this issue.
Performance-based revenue systems usually rank teams
in order of a certain figure, e.g. last year’s place in the ta-
ble, and allocate funds proportionally to the respective team’s
ranking place. The best team gets the highest share, the sec-
ond best the second highest share, and so on. In this system,
an overdominant team can increase the gap to its competi-
tors even more. To avoid this, it is useful to build perfor-
mance clusters within the system. As an example, instead
of ranking all teams after each other, there could be three
groups of clubs, divided in positive, medium and negative
performance. Using such a system, an overdominant club is
still rewarded for its performance, while not financially out-
pacing its direct competitors, which may struggle to keep up
with the top team anyways.
A second possibility to limit a single team’s dominance
is to use performance-based criteria, in which the respective
club is not leading. Although most performance-based cri-
teria are related to team’s competitive success, in which a
dominant club is commonly first, it is possible to introduce
alternative criteria. Examples for this are spectator-based
criteria, like TV viewing figures or social media activities,
sustainability-based criteria, like league belonging or invest-
ments in young talents, and others, such as fair play rank-
ings or ethical behaviour. A dominant club can reach good
ratings in those dimensions, too, but they give every club the
possibility to maximize their share of revenues, even with-
out a valuable team. This mean does therefore not harm the
principle of meritocracy, while rewarding performance in dif-
ferent dimensions and finally makes an overdominant team
relatively weaker.
A final possibility is to cap the final top-to-bottom pay-
out ratio within the league, as introduced with the new La
Liga revenue sharing system. It works as an upper limit for
the multiple the highest earning team earns in comparison
to the lowest earning team. If the allocation based on the
key yields a distribution in which club A earns four times the
amount team B earns, and the cap is at a multiple of three,
club A’s share would be reduced by the amount it needs for
the multiple to be three. The accruing new funds can then
be allocated to different causes. In order to boost competi-
tive balance, the funds could be allocated e.g. equally to the
bottom five earning clubs. Using a cap like this, it’s possible
to limit the impact of performance-based allocation to a cer-
tain degree. Consequently, if a low multiple, e.g. 1.5, gets
chosen, the league administration can guarantee a relatively
even distribution regardless of the chosen allocation key.
6.5. Feasibility of the Four-Pillar Revenue Sharing Model
After assessing the Bundesliga’s current situation, its aims
and optimal strategic positioning, and required modifications
of a revenue sharing system in order to achieve these objec-
tives, we are now finally able to evaluate the feasibility of the
new system.
Based on the previous analyses, it seems that an even
revenue sharing system solves our objectives one and two29.
However, it is not common to allocate all funds equally
among clubs in sports leagues. The nominal share that gets
distributed equally to all clubs amounts to 50% of domestic
revenues in both La Liga and Premier League. In the NFL,
this share is almost 100%, as the American sports league type
enables such equal systems while they would not be feasible
in European leagues. Although the Bundesliga’s new model
does not include an even share at first appearance, one of its
elements partly works like one. Pillar 1 (Performance) allo-
cates 70% of domestic revenues according to performance,
while always allocating 2.9% to the worst ranked 1. Bun-
desliga team, and 0.75% to the worst 2. Bundesliga team.
29Enhancement of Financial and Competitive Balance (1) and Increase of
Game Quality and Team Values (2)
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Better ranked teams naturally get a higher share, but the
base of 2.9% or 0.75% can be seen as an equal share, as it
gets allocated to every team in the respective league, regard-
less of its performance. Consequently, 65.7%30 of pillar 1 is
allocated equally, while only the remaining 34.3% are truly
performance-based. Pillar 2 (competitive sustainability) and
3 (young talent) do not follow a similar logic, as it is possible
for a team to have both zero Bundesliga seasons in the past
(pillar 2) and zero playing minutes of young players (pillar
3), respectively resulting in a pillar share of 0%. Pillar 4
(competition) works similarly to pillar 1, while the exact
percentages per table place are not disclosed. If we assume
that the same amount (65.7%) of revenues are allocated on
an equal basis through pillar 4, we can calculate the “real”
equally distributed share of the Bundesliga’s new system,
resulting in a final percentage of about 61%31. However, one
has to keep in mind that this figure considers both 1. and
2. Bundesliga, while 2. Bundesliga clubs get a smaller equal
share. If we exclude 2. Bundesliga from this calculation, we
find that 48.5%32 of total domestic revenues are exclusively
shared equal among 1. Bundesliga clubs.
Although this is a comparable figure to the nominally
equal domestic revenue parts in Spain and England (50%
each), both systems have similar minimum pay-out caps (e.g.
the last ranked team gets 2% of revenues) in their remaining
distribution pillars. Therefore, their effective equal share of
domestic revenues is higher than 50%. We can see that the
Bundesliga’s share of equal distribution is in a similar dimen-
sion to the ones in its competing leagues, but slightly lower.
For international Bundesliga revenues, the league’s new
model only allocates 25% equally, with the remaining 75%
based on previous performances in international competi-
tions. In the Premier League, 100% of all international rev-
enues are distributed equally, which shows a huge difference
to the new German system. While mainly the best clubs of the
Bundesliga, who arguably drive international demand, get
rewarded for demand from abroad, all Premier League clubs,
regardless of their contribution, get the same share of those
revenues. This mechanism promotes the principle of meri-
tocracy within the Bundesliga, although it seems to strongly
damage competitive balance (cf. Figure 11) as international
revenues represent a significant share of league incomes. We
can conclude that the Bundesliga’s current share of equally
allocated revenues are a step in the right direction, but still
lacks consistency in comparison to the league’s international
competitors. In order to tackle the objectives of increasing
the Bundesliga’s overall quality and competitive balance bet-
ter, it would make sense to increase this share even more, for
example through a radical reform of the distribution system
for international revenues.
When thinking about the feasibility of the new system in
302.9% * 18 teams + 0.75% * 18 teams = 65.7%
3165.7% * 70% (P1) + 0% * 5% (P2) + 0% * 2% (P3) + 65.7% * 23%
(P4) = 61.1%
322.9% * 18 teams * 70% (P1) + 0% * 5% (P2) + 0% * 2% (P3) + 2.9%
* 18 teams * 23% (P4) = 48.5%
fulfilling objective three33, several notable points become ap-
parent. Independently from the discussion of performance-
based and equal systems, the Bundesliga’s new model fea-
tures multiple starting points for a system that weakens an
overdominant team. Firstly, pillar 4 features a clustering
system in which several teams get the same reward of a
performance-based criteria. More specifically, the first six
teams in this weighted five-year ranking get the same share
of revenues. However, pillar 4 is the only element to use
such a cluster, representing 23% of total revenues, which is
still a relatively small number. Secondly, the new four-pillar
model includes several performance-based criteria that are
not based on competitive success. Both pillar 2 and 3 re-
ward clubs for accomplishments (league belonging and youth
work), that are achievable without being one of the league’s
top teams, incentivising clubs to work in a sustainable way to
maximize their income. This type of pillar prevents a dom-
inance of Bayern Munich in all pillars, as it is e.g. hard to
maximize both competitive success and playing minutes of
young players. Still, those two pillars only cover 7% of all
revenues, meaning that only a small share of the system fol-
lows this logic. Finally, the Bundesliga indirectly uses a top-
to-bottom payout cap. As explained before, pillar 1 and 4
allocate revenues based on a ranking of the clubs’ competi-
tive success, although the payout per ranking place is fixed
to a certain percentage. This prevents an overdominant team
from gaining overproportional shares of revenue. No matter
if Bayern Munich achieved 1 or 100 more points more than
the second-best team in the respective ranking, the club’s
share will still be the same. Overall, we can summarize that
the Bundesliga’s new revenue sharing model features several
feasible starting points to tackle the issue of an overdomi-
nant FC Bayern. However, their weighting should be higher
to fully use these mechanisms. In the system’s current state,
the scope of those means is too low to expect immediate re-
sults.
After analysing the feasibility of the new system in terms
of meeting the league’s potential objectives, it makes sense to
discuss the system’s consequences on its main stakeholders in
order to fully understand the reform’s scope. As the reform
decreased the performance-based share of the allocation key,
the system is likely to produce a more balanced league than
before. Based on Chapter 3.5, a higher competitive balance
is likely to increase demand for TV broadcasts and decrease
demand for attendance. However, both the difference be-
tween the old and new model, as well as the impact of un-
certainty of outcome on demand for football, are rather low.
Therefore, we can infer that the impact of the new model on
demand will be neutral or slightly positive (as TV audiences
play a larger role in the clubs’ income than stadium audi-
ences). Based on our thoughts and assumptions, it is likely
that the Bundesliga aims to follow a strategy similar to the
Premier League’s one, by building a high-quality league with
high uncertainty of outcome. If the league succeeds in do-
ing so, which seems like a realistic scenario through the new
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revenue sharing system, the Premier League might suffer in
terms of future growth and dominance. Although La Liga
currently seems to have a protected strategic positioning, its
international demand might be threatened by the Bundesliga
in the future as well.
The effect on the Bundesliga’s internal stakeholders, its
clubs, differs based on the individual team’s situation. In
general, the system aims at increasing every club’s income
through the league’s new TV deal. Therefore, there are no
teams that lose income in absolute terms, but clubs whose
relative income is impacted. While we do not have the pos-
sibility to compare the new system directly with the incum-
bent one, we can see some clear trends. Firstly, the league
tries to move away from only rewarding competitive success,
as it included several new success criteria in its model. Sec-
ondly, the share of income that gets distributed equally to
all clubs, increased. Finally, international revenues are still
allocated heavily performance-based, especially in compari-
son to other leagues. These effects lead to different impacts
within the league. New performance-based criteria benefit
all clubs who cannot achieve top ranking positions in compet-
itive rankings, but can dominate the new pillars 2 and 3. A
more even system in general benefits every club with below-
average revenue sharing income, as the performance-based
share becomes smaller and freed-up funds are distributed
equally to all clubs, leading to a higher relative share of less
wealthy teams. However, the performance-based distribu-
tion of international TV revenues works in the opposite di-
rection: clubs who participate in international competitions
are heavily rewarded for it, which gives them the possibility
to extend their advantage even more and makes them likely
to participate in those cups again. Overall, we can conclude
that clubs in the bottom-table region and clubs, who partic-
ipate in international competitions, benefit. As these groups
are normally mutually exclusive, it is hard to determine spe-
cific winners and losers of the reform.
However, the new system can be seen as a step into
the right direction, as several starting points that can work
towards the league’s aims and objectives were integrated.
These mechanisms have a relatively weak impact by now,
mitigating an immediate effect of the reform. If their weight
in the system is reassessed and raised, it is likely that the
system will support the Bundesliga in achieving its goals
in the near future. Therefore, we evaluate the total effect
of the reform as slightly positive, with potential for future
improvements.
6.6. Possible Enhancements to the New Model
While the Bundesliga’s new four-pillar revenue sharing
system is already an improvement compared to the existing
system, there are several possible enhancements that could
be realised in the future. Through the theoretical league
model introduced in Chapter 6.4.1, it is possible to model
potential consequences of different revenue sharing systems
on the medium-term development of a league. A simulation
of a solely performance based (cf. Chapter 7.3), balanced
(cf. Chapter 7.4) and perfectly equal revenue (cf. Chap-
ter 7.5) sharing system applied on the Bundesliga’s current
market value distribution can be found in the Appendix.
When comparing these simulations, the theoretical result
from 6.4.1 holds: the higher the share of performance-based
allocation, the lower the future competitive balance. In our
practical example, this is confirmed through higher top-to-
bottom and top-to-average market value multiples, as well
as a higher standard deviation of market values. Figure
12 shows this negative relationship between the share of
equally distributed revenues and the ratio of market val-
ues between the highest and lowest team. Hence, it would
make sense to increase the equally distributed share in the
system even more. This would likely lead into the cycle of
even revenue sharing systems (cf. Figure 10) discussed be-
fore. To implement this, the easiest lever would be to reform
the distribution of international TV revenues from a heav-
ily performance-based system to a perfectly equal system.
An additional option would be to modify the percentages
per ranking place of some pillars. Pillar 1 allocates 5.8% to
the first ranked Bundesliga team and 2.9% to the last one.
This could be modified to e.g. 4.8% and 3.9%, respectively,
narrowing the gap between teams within the league and
enhancing competitive balance.
As noted before, some mechanisms in the new system are
useful, but should be implemented heavier in order to reach
their full potential of intervention. It would make sense to in-
crease the respective shares of pillar 2 and 3, which are rela-
tively low at the moment. If those would cover a larger share
of total revenues, more funds would be distributed to clubs
across the whole league (as any club can perform well on
these criteria) and the financial dominance of stronger clubs
would diminish. As these pillars were just implemented, it
makes sense to check for general feasibility for some seasons
first. If the criteria are found to work well, the Bundesliga
can think about increasing their share, e.g. doubling their
weight to 10% (pillar 2) and 4% (pillar 3). Additionally, the
clustering system used in pillar 4 could be transferred to the
other pillars as well. Using groups within rankings, it is pos-
sible to prevent few clubs from having significantly different
incomes than others. This balances out financials within the
league and increases competitive balance. As an example for
an implementation of this enhancement, every pillar could,
instead of ranking club by club, build groups of six clubs and
order these by good, medium and bad performance. This
could lead to a payoff distribution in which FC Bayern Mu-
nich, Borussia Dortmund and RB Leipzig would all get the
same amount of revenues, as they all performed in the top
group in every pillar, preventing Bayern Munich from out-
pacing its competitors.
Finally, it could make sense to implement an explicit cap
that limits the top-to-bottom payout ratio, similar to La Liga’s
new system. As discussed before, such a limit prevents sin-
gle clubs from incurring unproportional amounts of revenue,
both at the upper and lower end. Regardless of the ex-
act workings of the revenue sharing system, the final payoff
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would always be lower than a certain multiple34. While the
top-to-bottom income ratio is already comparably low in the
Bundesliga (cf. Figure 6), this would be an opportunity to
further narrow the gap between high and low earning clubs.
This could again lead to the circle of even revenue sharing
systems (cf. Figure 10).
While the majority of these possible enhancement aim
at lowering current top earners’ incomes, one has to con-
sider the revenue split of Bundesliga clubs. As discussed be-
fore, top earning teams earn less than 30% of their revenues
through media. Additionally, clubs participating in inter-
national cup tournaments usually receive high participation
prizes, especially in the UEFA Champions League. Therefore,
these possible improvements would damage higher earning
clubs only little, while creating relatively high additional in-
comes for smaller clubs. All the suggested enhancements
appear to be feasible, as they do not actively disadvantage
top clubs, but rather introduce new ways of performance-
based revenue distribution. Especially smaller clubs and the
league’s administration (DFL) are likely to approve these sug-
gestions, as they have the potential to make the Bundesliga
more balanced, attractive and demanded, while leveraging
the league’s existing USPs.
This assessment, including possible enhancements to the
system, is based on the steps the Bundesliga should take to
achieve the strategic positioning discussed in Chapter 6.3. If
the Bundesliga’s aim would be to maximize Bayern Munich’s
financial and competitive strength in order for it to win in-
ternational titles, regardless of the domestic situation, the as-
sessment would certainly be a different one. Furthermore,
our assessment is based on the assumption that the Uncer-
tainty of Outcome Hypothesis is (partly) accepted (for TV au-
diences) (cf. Chapter 3.5). However, Mr. Rauball’s statement
regarding the system’s aim, and the majority of Bundesliga
spectators from Germany and abroad, would agree that the
Bundesliga should preferably become more balanced in or-
der to be successful in the future. Therefore, this assessment
is likely to be congruent with the Bundesliga’s aims for the
next decades. It remains to be seen how the new revenue
sharing model will influence the league’s balance, interna-
tional positioning and overall development. Based on our
assessment, it is likely that this reform will not be the last of
its kind in the next decades, as several key mechanisms have
been introduced, but not yet been given enough weight to
have significant impact on the league.
34As an example, the highest earning team could never earn more than
twice the lowest earning team
N. T. Bretschneider / Junior Management Science 3(1) (2018) 16-3736
References
Allan, G. Does television crowd out spectators? Journal of Sports Economics,
9(6):592–605, 2008.
Andreff, W. Some comparative economics of the organization of sports: com-
petition and regulation in north American vs. European professional team
sports leagues. The European Journal of Comparative Economics, 8(1):
3–27, 2011. Retrieved from http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-
00677436.
Ashelm, M. Bündnis „Team Marktwert“: Traditionsklubs wollen mehr
TV-Geld, 2016. URL http://www.faz.net/aktuell/sport/fussba
ll/bundesliga/buendnis-team-marktwert-traditionsklubs-w
ollen-mehr-tv-geld-14151976.html. Retrieved March 21, 2017.
Atkinson, S. E., Stanley, L. R., and Tschirhart, J. Revenue sharing as an
incentive in an agency problem: An example from the National Football
League. The RAND Journal of Economics Journal of Economics, 19(1):
27–43, 1988.
Beck, J. Neuer TV-Vertrag wirft seine Schatten voraus, 2017. URL
http://www.volksstimme.de/sport/handball/sc_magdeburg/h
andball-neuer-tv-vertrag-wirft-seine-schatten-voraus.
Retrieved April 11, 2017.
Belzer, J. Thanks To Roger Goodell, NFL Revenues Projected To Surpass $
13 Billion In 2016, 2016. URL https://www.forbes.com/sites/jas
onbelzer/2016/02/29/thanks-to-roger-goodell-nfl-revenue
s-projected-to-surpass-13-billion-in-2016/#23a90d541cb7.
Retrieved April 11, 2017.
Besanko, D. A. and Simon, D. Resource allocation in the baseball player’s
labor market: An empirical investigation. Review of Financial Economics,
21(1):71–84, 1985.
Bloom, H. NFL revenue-sharing model good for business, 2014. URL
http://www.sportingnews.com/nfl/news/nfl-revenue-sharing
-television-contracts-2014-season-business-model-nba-n
hl-mlb-comparison-salary-cap/gu0xok7mphu01x3vu875oeaq6.
Borland, J. and MacDonald, R. Demand for sport. Oxford Review of Economic
Policy, 19(4):478–502, 2003.
Buraimo, B. Stadium attendance and television audience demand in En-
glish league football. Managerial and Decision Economics, 29(6):513–523,
2008.
Buraimo, B. and Simmons, R. Uncertainty of outcome or star quality? televi-
sion audience demand for English Premier League football. International
Journal of the Economics of Business, 22(3):449–469, 2015.
Cox, A. Spectator demand, uncertainty of results, and public interest: Evi-
dence from the English Premier League. Journal of Sports Economics, 19
(1):1–28, 2018.
Destatis. Bevölkerung in Deutschland voraussichtlich auf 82,8 Millionen
gestiegen, 2017. URL https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseServic
e/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2017/01/PD17_033_12411.html.
Retrieved March 26, 2017.
DFL. Deutsche Fußball Liga: DFL-Präsidium fasst einstimmi-
gen Entschluss zur Verteilung der Medien-Erlöse, 2016. URL
http://www.bundesliga.de/de/liga/news/dfl-medienerloe
s-beschluss-einstimmig-agmd.jsp. Retrieved March 20, 2017.
DFL. Deutsche fußball liga: Dfl-report 2017, 2017.
Dietl, H. M., Franck, E., Lang, M., and Rathke, A. Salary cap regulation in
professional team sports. Contemporary Economic Policy, 30(3):307–319,
2012.
DKB. Dkb handball bundesliga - zuschauer, 2017. URL http://www.
dkb-handball-bundesliga.de/de/dkb-hbl/statistiken/saiso
nen/statistiken/saison-15-16/saisonstatistik/zuschauer/.
Retrieved April 11, 2017.
Domizio, M. D. Football on TV: An Empirical Analysis on the Italian Couch
Potato. Papeles de Europa, 26(1):26–45, 2013.
DPA. Der Streit um die Verteilung der TV-Gelder, 2016. URL
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/news/sport/fussball-der-s
treit-um-die-verteilung-der-tv-gelder-dpa.urn-newsml-d
pa-com-20090101-161123-99-289401. Retrieved March 21, 2017.
El-Hodiri, M. and Quirk, J. An economic model of a professional sports
league. Journal of Political Economy, 79(6):1302–1319, 1971.
Evelt, A. Bundesliga: Klubs aus dem “Team Marktwert” müssen besser
arbeiten, 2016. URL http://www.spiegel.de/sport/fussball/bu
ndesliga-klubs-aus-dem-team-marktwert-muessen-besser-a
rbeiten-a-1084817.html. Retrieved March 21, 2017.
Fishman, P. Competitive balance and free agency in major league
baseball. The American Economist, 47(2):86–91, 2003. URL
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=527829711&Fmt=7&cl
ientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
Forbes. The business of football list, 2016. URL https://www.forbes.com
/nfl-valuations/list/. Retrieved April 13, 2017.
Forrest, D., Simmons, R., and Buraimo, B. Outcome uncertainty and the
couch potato audience. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 52(4):641–
661, 2005.
Fort, R. and Maxcy, J. Competitive balance in sports leagues: An introduc-
tion. Journal of Sports Economics, 4(2):154–160, 2003.
Fort, R. and Quirk, J. Cross-subsidization, incentives, and outcomes in pro-
fessional team sports leagues. Journal of Economic Literature, 33(3):
1265–1299, 1995.
Fort, R., Maxcy, J., and Diehl, M. Uncertainty by regulation: Rottenberg’s
invariance principle. Research in Economics, 70(3):454–467, 2016.
Harris, N. Premier League sides have their eye on the TV cash bonanza,
2016. URL http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/artic
le-3381083/Premier-League-sides-eye-TV-cash-bonanza-wor
st-season-relegated-flight.html. Retrieved March 21, 2017.
Heckle, H. A new law will see La Liga television money distributed
evenly, stopping Real Madrid and Barcelona taking the most cash, 2015.
URL http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article
-3063560/A-new-law-La-Liga-television-money-distributed
-evenly-stopping-Real-Madrid-Barcelona-taking-cash.html.
Retrieved April 3, 2017.
Heitner, D. How Major League Soccer Is Closing The Gap With The Big
Four, 2015. URL https://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner
/2015/12/22/how-major-league-soccer-is-closing-the-gap
-with-the-big-four/#620ee1386c20. Retrieved April 5, 2017.
Kicker. 1. Bundesliga: alle Zuschauerzahlen der Saison 2015/16, 2017.
URL http://www.kicker.de/news/fussball/bundesliga/spielta
g/1-bundesliga/2015-16/zuschauer-der-saison.html. Retrieved
April 11, 2017.
Landwehr, F. Chronik: Die Entwicklung der TV-Rechte im deutschen Fußball,
2015. URL http://www.11freunde.de/artikel/chronik-die-ent
wicklung-der-tv-rechte-im-deutschen-fussball/page/1. Re-
trieved March 28, 2017.
Larsen, A., Fenn, A. J., and Spenner, E. L. The impact of free agency and
the salary cap on competitive balance in the National Football League.
Journal of Sports Economics, 7(4):374–390, 2006.
McDonald, H. The factors influencing churn rates among season ticket hold-
ers: An empirical analysis. Journal of Sport Management, 24(6):676–701,
2010.
McMahon, B. $1.6B Worth Of TV Deals Good News For Real Madrid,
Barcelona and La Liga, 2015. URL https://www.forbes.com/sites
/bobbymcmahon/2015/12/05/1-6b-worth-of-tv-deals-good-n
ews-for-real-madrid-barcelona-and-la-liga/#1fd73983166f.
Retrieved April 3, 2017.
Mitteldeutsche Zeitung. Vereine mit TV-Gelder-Verteilung zufrieden, 2016.
URL http://www.mz-web.de/sport/fussball/bundesliga/verein
e-mit-tv-gelder-verteilung-zufrieden-25170008. Retrieved
April 11, 2017.
Mourão, P. R. and Teixeira, J. S. Gini playing soccer. Applied Economics, 47
(49):5229–5246, 2015.
Neale, W. C. The peculiar economics of professional sports. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 78(1):1–14, 1964.
Nightengale, B. MLB officials cautiously optimistic they’ll beat deadline for
new CBA, 2016. URL https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/
mlb/2016/11/29/mlb-collective-bargaining-agreement-locko
ut/94609712/. Retrieved April 11, 2017.
Novy-Williams, E. NFL Revenue Reaches $7.1 Billion Based on Green Bay
Report, 2016. URL https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2016-06-24/nfl-revenue-reaches-7-1-billion-based-on-gre
en-bay-report. Retrieved April 11, 2017.
Owen, P. D. Limitations of the relative standard deviation of win percentages
for measuring competitive balance in sports leagues. Economics Letters,
109(1):38–41, 2010.
Pawlowski, T., Breuer, C., and Hovemann, A. Top clubs’ performance and the
competitive situation in european domestic football competitions. Jour-
nal of Sports Economics, 11(2):186–202, 2010.
N. T. Bretschneider / Junior Management Science 3(1) (2018) 16-37 37
Premier League. Premier League’s payments to clubs in 2015/16, 2016. URL
https://www.premierleague.com/news/60138. Retrieved March 30,
2017.
Quitzau, J. Tradition ist mehr Fernsehgeld wert, 2015. URL http://www.ca
pital.de/meinungen/tradition-ist-mehr-tv-geld-wert.html.
Retrieved March 28, 2017.
Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, & University of Tübingen. How
exciting are the major European football leagues?, 2013. URL
https://www.rolandberger.com/publications/publication_
pdf/roland_berger_competitive_balance_of_football_league
s_20130220_1_.pdf.
Rosen, S. and Sanderson, A. Labour markets in professional sports. The
Economic Journal, 111(469):47–68, 2001.
Rottenberg, S. The baseball players’ labor market. The Journal of Political
Economy, 64(3):242–258, 1956.
Sanderson, A. R. and Siegfried, J. J. Thinking about competitive balance.
Journal of Sports Economics, 4(4):255–279, 2003.
Scelles, N., Durand, C., Bonnal, L., Goyeau, D., and Andreff, W. Competitive
balance versus competitive intensity before a match: Is one of these two
concepts more relevant in explaining attendance? The case of the French
football Ligue 1 over the period 2008–2011. Applied Economics, 45(29):
4184–4192, 2013.
Schreyer, D., Schmidt, S. L., and Torgler, B. Game outcome uncertainty
and television audience demand: New evidence from German football.
German Economic Review, pages 1–22, 2016.
Schreyer, D., Schmidt, S. L., and Torgler, B. Against all odds? exploring
the role of game outcome uncertainty in season ticket holders’ stadium
attendance demand. Journal of Economic Psychology, 56:192–217, 2016a.
Schreyer, D., Schmidt, S. L., and Torgler, B. Game outcome uncertainty in
the English Premier League: Do German fans care? Journal of Sports
Economics, pages 1–20, 2016b.
Sloane, P. J. Rottenberg and the economics of sport after 50 years: An eval-
uation. Journal of Sports Economics, 2175, 2006.
Smith, C. Major League Soccer Announces New TV Deals With ESPN, Fox,
Univision, 2014. URL https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissm
ith/2014/05/12/major-league-soccer-announces-new-tv-dea
ls-with-espn-fox-univision/#73c1478a2de7. Retrieved April 5,
2017.
Sportschau. DFL verteilt das Fernsehgeld neu, 2016. URL
http://www.sportschau.de/fussball/bundesliga/bundesli
ga-fussball-dfl-verteilt-fernsehgeld-100.html. Retrieved
March 20, 2017.
Statista. Number of Super Bowl viewers (TV) 2017, 2017. URL
https://www.statista.com/statistics/216526/super-bow
l-us-tv-viewership/. Retrieved April 12, 2017.
Szymanski, S. The economic design of sporting contests. Journal of Economic
Literature, 41(4):1137–1187, 2003.
Szymanski, S. and Késenne, S. Competitive balance and gate revenue shar-
ing in team sports. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 52(1):165–177,
2004.
Taylor, M. Revenue Sharing In Major League Soccer. Coventry University,
2015. URL https://curve.coventry.ac.uk/open/file/e8eb7c
23-8f98-4b28-bd67-1a6050222a00/1/RevenueSharingInMajorLe
agueSoccer_Redacted.pdf.
The Guardian. Premier League broadcasting revenue: how is it dis-
tributed?, 2012. URL https://www.theguardian.com/news/datab
log/2011/oct/12/football-broadcasting-deal-liverpool. Re-
trieved March 30, 2017.
Totalsportek. Premier League TV Rights Money Distribution (2016-19),
2015. URL http://www.totalsportek.com/money/premier-leagu
e-tv-rights-money-distribution/. Retrieved March 30, 2017.
Totalsportek. Spanish La Liga New 3 Year TV Deal Worth € 2.65 billion,
2016. URL http://www.totalsportek.com/money/spanish-la-lig
a-new-3-year-tv-deal-worth-e2-65-billion/. Retrieved April 5,
2017.
Transfermarkt.de. Die letzten Marktwert-Updates, 2017a. URL
http://www.transfermarkt.de/spieler-statistik/marktwe
rtaenderungen/marktwertetop. Retrieved May 4, 2017.
UEFA. UEFA rankings for club competitions, 2017. URL http://www.ue
fa.com/memberassociations/uefarankings/country/. Retrieved
April 24, 2017.
US Census Bureau. U.S. and World Population Clock, 2017. URL https:
//www.census.gov/popclock/. Retrieved March 26, 2017.
Van Der Burg, T. and Prinz, A. Progressive taxation as a means for improving
competitive balance. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 52(1):65–74,
2005.
Vrooman, J. A general theory of professional sports leagues. Southern Eco-
nomic Journal, 61(4):971–990, 1995.
Wilson, B. Premier League revenues hit a new high but profits fall, 2016. URL
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-36034403. Retrieved April 11,
2017.
Zimbalist, A. S. Competitive balance in sports leagues: An introduction.
Journal of Sports Economics, 2002.
